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“YOU WANT INSURANCE WITH THAT?” USING 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
FROM ADD-ON INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
 
TOM BAKER* 
PETER SIEGELMAN∗ 
 
*** 
 
Persistently high profits on “insurance” for small value losses sold as an 
add-on to other products or services (such as extended warranties sold 
with consumer electronics, loss damage waivers sold with a car rental, and 
credit life insurance sold with a loan) pose a twofold challenge to the 
standard economic analysis of insurance.  First, expected utility theory 
teaches that people should not buy insurance for small value losses.  
Second, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to charge 
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.  Combining 
the insights of the Gabaix and Laibson shrouded pricing model with the 
behavioral economics of insurance, this article explains why high profits 
for add-on insurance persist and describes the negative distributional and 
welfare consequences of an unregulated market for such insurance.  The 
article explores four potential regulatory responses: enhanced disclosure, 
a ban on the point of sale offer of add-on insurance, price regulation, and 
the creation of a new, on-line market.  Drawing on theoretical, empirical, 
and comparative law sources, the article explains why enhanced disclosure 
will not work, the circumstances under which a point of sale ban is 
desirable, and why a new, on-line market is preferable to price regulation 
in circumstances in which a point of sale ban is undesirable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Informed observers of insurance markets have long marveled at the 
high prices charged for a wide variety of low value insurance products sold 
as “add-ons” to consumers buying other products and services.  Examples 
include the extended warranties sold with electronics and home appliances, 
the credit life insurance and identity theft protection sold with mortgages, 
auto loans, and credit cards, and the collision damage waivers and short 
term liability insurance sold with car rentals.  Unlike iPhones or Gucci 
bags, there is nothing obviously cool or distinctive about add-on insurance 
products.  They are just contingent claims on money – often small amounts 
of money – that, like other forms of insurance, protect consumers from 
losses that are easy to predict in the aggregate and should, in theory, sell at 
prices that are close to insurers’ predicted costs.  Yet sellers are able to 
charge prices for add-on insurance products that consistently and greatly 
exceed the cost of providing the insurance, well beyond what is possible in 
other parts of the consumer insurance market.  These excess profits have 
negative distributional consequences and lead to substantial efficiency 
losses. 
Insurance regulators have long suspected that these high profits 
reveal that there is something awry in the sale of insurance add-ons.  
Investigations of credit life insurance in the 1950s,1 collision damage 
 
1 See, e.g., Sunderland v. Day, 145 N.E.2d 39, 39 (Ill. 1957) (interpreting Ill. 
Small Loans Act to forbid a lender from requiring – as was apparently common – 
that borrower purchase credit life insurance as a condition precedent to the making 
of a loan); Leland J. Gordon, Book Review, 25 J. INS. 77 (1958) (discussing a 
finding of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly that 
significant “abuses in the consumer credit insurance business[,] which included 
sales of credit insurance far in excess of money loaned, failure to deliver the policy 
to the borrower, payment of excessive commissions, pyramiding of policies by 
requiring the borrower to purchase a second policy upon refinancing his loan 
without cancellation of the first policy, and failure to make a refund of unearned 
premiums”); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE 
REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 39-51 (1970) (chapter 
entitled “Credit Insurance Abuses”). Interestingly, the volume of scholarly 
literature on credit life seems to have peaked in the 1960s, and relatively little has 
been written about it since then; Philip H. Peters, How Should Credit Life 
Insurance be Regulated, 1958 INS. L. J. 529 (1958) (suggesting problems were 
widespread); William T. Beadles, Control of Abuses Under Credit Life and Health 
Insurance, 26 J. INS. 1 (1959) (detailing a litany of abuses and suggesting 
regulations to counter them). 
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waivers in the 1980s,2 and extended warranties in recent years3 have 
documented the excess profits earned on the sale of these insurance 
products, along with the abusive sales practices that such profits induce.  
Yet, regulators have struggled to identify how these excess profits are 
sustained.  Indeed, an otherwise impressive study by the Competition 
Commission of the United Kingdom in 2003 attributes excess profits 
earned on the sale of extended warranties for consumer electronics to an ill-
defined “complex monopoly situation” that the study never really explains.4 
Not surprisingly, the Commission’s solution – a set of information forcing 
measures adopted in 2005 – has not worked.5 
The conceptual problem for the Competition Commission, state 
insurance departments, and most other consumer protection agencies that 
have examined add-on insurance markets can be traced to the economic 
model they use.  The add-on insurance product market quite literally “does 
not compute” within the standard Insurance Economics 101 framework that 
 
2 See, e.g., Iowa Dep’t of Ins., Proposal to the Market Conduct of Consumer 
Affairs (EX3) Subcommittee re: Proposed Model Statute on Collision Damage 
Waivers, 1 NAIC Proc. 173 (1985). 
3 COMPETITION COMM’N, A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED 
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC [HOUSEHOLD] ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE UK, 
2003, 1, at 3 available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www. 
competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2003/485xwars.htm#summary. In 
the US, a 1985 lawsuit by Maine Attorney General James Tierney alleged that 
retailer Sears, Roebuck used unfair and deceptive trade practices to sell extended 
warranties. See State v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. CV-84-133, 1985 LEXIS 239, 
at *44 (Me. Super. Aug. 29, 1985). These allegedly included: (a) selling coverage 
that duplicated manufacturers’ express warranties that were already included in the 
purchase price, and (b) after the consumer had made the decision to purchase the 
product, overstating the need for warranties by exaggerating the probability that a 
product would fail. Id. While noting that extended warranties were “highly 
profitable” for Sears, id. at *51, the court concluded that there were no deceptive 
trade practices involved because “the State . . . failed to demonstrate that Sears 
misleads customers when it sells maintenance agreements by making them believe 
that they must purchase, either through maintenance agreements or through 
prospective repair costs, what the law gives them for free.” Id. at *76. 
4 COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 6. 
5 Recently, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading – which has shown an appreciation 
for behavioral economics – has taken a fresh look at extended warranties, finding 
that the extended warranty market remains “unfair and uncompetitive” and 
proposing a new round of reforms. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED 
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2012, 1403 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-work/OFT1403.pdf. For the OFT’s 
interest in behavioral economics, see, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, WHAT DOES 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS MEAN FOR COMPETITION POLICY?, 2010, 1224 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf. 
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has informed insurance regulation, leaving regulators without a reliable 
guide to action.  Regulators’ intuition and common sense tell them that 
consumers are being exploited, but the dominant conceptual framework in 
their field cannot tell them how or why, or what to do to prevent that 
exploitation.  
When they do try to address the perceived exploitation – as the 
Competition Commission did for extended warranties in 2005 – regulators 
understandably lack the confidence to go beyond non-controversial 
strategies, such as mandatory disclosure or other information-forcing 
mechanisms.  Disclosure rarely improves consumer markets in any 
context,6 and, as the Competition Commission experience demonstrates, 
does not provide meaningful protection to consumers purchasing add-on 
insurance products.  In the end, regulators typically give up.  This explains 
why, for example, many of the credit life insurance abuses identified in the 
1950s and rental car insurance abuses identified in the 1980s persist today.7 
The persistence of large profits in add-on insurance products poses 
two main conceptual problems for the standard economic analysis 
employed in insurance regulation.  First, according to that analysis, there 
should not even be a robust market for most of these kinds of insurance 
products.  The expected utility theory that lies at the core of the economic 
analysis of insurance teaches, unequivocally, that people should not buy 
insurance for low value losses.8 The whole point of insurance under 
expected utility theory is to shift money from states of the world in which 
people do not need their last dollar very much (their marginal utility of 
money is low) to states of the world in which they could put that dollar to 
much better use (their marginal utility of money is high).  The amounts of 
money at stake in most add-on insurance products are simply too small for 
that difference in marginal utility to explain consumer behavior.  Moreover, 
whatever slight difference there may be in the marginal utility of money 
between the time a person buys the insurance and the time when she 
collects on it is more than offset by the transaction costs involved (even 
leaving aside the excess profits).  This is Insurance Economics 101.9 
 
6 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schnieder, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
7 See infra text accompanying note 119. 
8 See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INSURANCE 176, 188 (2nd ed. 2004); Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219 (2001); KENNETH J. 
ARROW, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 
(1971); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 
ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964). 
9 Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 8; infra text accompanying Figure 1. 
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Second, even if it did make sense for people to buy add-on 
insurance products, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to 
charge prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.  
Excess profits should bring new competitors into the market.  Even if most 
people are not careful shoppers, some are.  Their careful shopping should 
benefit all consumers, as sellers compete for the careful shoppers by 
reducing prices for the add-on insurance products.10  This is 
Microeconomics 101 applied to insurance markets. 
As we will explain, the problem is not with economics, per se, but 
rather with the failure of insurance law and regulation to move beyond 
Economics 101.  Behavioral economic analysis has addressed both of the 
conceptual problems presented by the 101-level analyses.  First, borrowing 
from psychological research, behavioral economics provides a compelling 
explanation for why people choose to insure against small losses, even at 
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.11 Second, 
using a simple (in retrospect) equilibrium model, behavioral economics 
provides a compelling explanation of why prices for add-on insurance so 
often greatly exceed cost, even when sellers operate in a competitive 
market for the primary product or service to which the insurance products 
are add-ons.12 
Of the two parts to this behavioral economic explanation, the 
second is decidedly more important for improving insurance law and 
regulation.  The first part simply puts more rigorous science behind what 
regulators, marketers, and ordinary people already knew: people are willing 
to pay for “peace of mind” to an extent that goes well beyond what 
expected utility theory would predict, especially when they are buying a 
 
10 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 630, 638 (1979) (concluding that “the presence of at least some consumer 
search in a market creates the possibility of a ‘pecuniary externality’: persons who 
search sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms.”).  Moreover, in 
their model, if at least one-third of consumers undertake comparison shopping, the 
market price will be close to the competitive price in market where all consumers 
are informed. Id. at 655. 
11 See, e.g., Eric Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard 
Kunreuther, Framing, Probability Distortions and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 35, 42 (1993); Paul J. H. Shoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, 
An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J.  RISK & INS. 603 (1979). For 
an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY  & STACEY 
MCMORROW, INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013). 
12 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer 
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 
505 (2006). 
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product or service that puts their peace of mind in question.  Indeed, taken 
all by itself, this first part could do more harm than good, at least in relation 
to the regulation of add-on insurance products.  It is a short step from a 
better understanding of why people like peace of mind insurance to the 
claim that there is no need to do anything to protect consumers, other than 
perhaps mandating certain disclosures, because sellers are simply satisfying 
consumers’ legitimate preferences.  Some recent writing by highly 
regarded law and economics scholars points in that direction, using the 
language of consumer sovereignty.13 
The second part of the behavioral economic analysis reveals the 
existence of heretofore unappreciated “situational monopolies”14 that 
require – and hence authorize the use of – more powerful regulatory tools 
than mere disclosure to fix.  This second part has not yet been taken into 
account in the law and economic analysis of insurance.  Thus, there is 
reason to believe that scholars using consumer sovereignty to support a 
light touch to the regulation of peace of mind insurance products might 
reconsider their analysis, at least in the context of add-on insurance 
products.  
It is important to emphasize that we are not merely adding together 
two disparate strands of behavioral economics.  The combination of the 
shrouded pricing/situational monopoly model with the behavioral 
economics of low-value insurance yields a key insight into the welfare 
analysis of this market that is not present in either story by itself.  As we 
spell-out in more detail below, the shrouded pricing model explains in 
general terms how supra-competitive prices for second-stage or 
supplemental products (e.g., razor blades, toner cartridges for laser printers) 
can be maintained in equilibrium.  In these cases, the second stage product 
is an appropriate – or even necessary – complement to the first stage 
product: razor blades and toner cartridges have finite lives, and razors or 
printers are useless without them.  Consumers may have a choice among 
 
13 See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3 
ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010). 
14 The term “situational monopoly” has appeared in the law and economics 
literature in the analysis of secured transactions and the application of the contract 
doctrine of duress.  See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured 
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-71 (1978-
1979) on secured financing and the competitive advantage that a creditor with a 
security interest in after-acquired property enjoys over other lenders and MICHAEL 
J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 78 - 101 (1993) on duress. 
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competing second-stage products, but they cannot avoid purchasing any 
second-stage product at all. 
That is decidedly not the case when the second-stage product is 
add-on insurance, the purchase of which is irrational to begin with.  The 
option not to buy at all is not only real, it is compelling (at least to rational 
consumers).  That, in turn, means that sellers must undertake efforts to 
convince customers to buy the add-on insurance product.  Moreover, such 
efforts are highly profitable because of the supra-competitive prices 
charged for add-ons, which implies that all kinds of hard-sell tactics are 
virtually compulsory because the marginal return to a dollar spent on 
inducing a customer to purchase add-on insurance is high.  
The efficiency consequences of such hard-sell practices are not 
trivial.  Such tactics are deployed against all buyers (whether they actually 
purchase the add-on insurance or not), and are properly counted as a waste 
of customer and seller time, a real welfare loss that is not present in the 
original shrouding model.15 In our view, “merely” protecting 
unsophisticated consumers from tactics that redistribute wealth to 
sophisticated consumers is a worthy goal in itself, and one that is shared by 
most insurance regulators.  But the shrouded pricing of small-loss 
insurance has efficiency consequences as well, as we discuss below. 
This Article is organized as follows.  In Part I we describe three 
examples of add-on insurance products – extended warranties for consumer 
products, loss damage waivers for rental cars, and credit life insurance – 
and discuss the irrationality of purchasing these products under a standard 
expected utility approach.  In Part II we develop a behavioral economic 
analysis of these products that helps explain why people buy them and, 
more importantly, why competition fails to reduce their prices to something 
approaching their cost.  In Part III we discuss the implications of this 
analysis for insurance regulation, exploring four possible strategies: 
improved disclosure of the terms of add-on insurance products, a ban on 
the sale of the products as an add-on, price regulation, and the use of 
information technology to create a robust market at the point of sale.  
Drawing from recent U.K. experience, we recommend a mixed approach 
for the three specific products we examine: a ban on the sale of credit life 
insurance and extended warranties as add-ons and a new, on-line market 
for car rental insurance that customers can access at the car rental desk.  
Ours is a more activist and decidedly old school approach – with a 
high tech twist for car rental insurance – than forward thinking insurance 
regulators have entertained in recent years, but there is new science and a 
 
15 For example, East Coast readers may reflect on the need to check a box on 
the Amtrak website indicating that, no, you do not want to buy the $10 travel 
insurance on a $60 train ticket. 
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new regulatory environment behind our proposal.  The new science is 
behavioral economics.  The new regulatory environment is developing in 
response to the financial crisis of 2008.  In the legislative process leading to 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank financial reform statute, state insurance 
regulators successfully argued for the exemption of insurance products 
from the jurisdiction of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, on 
the grounds that state insurance regulation was already looking out for 
consumers and that state-based regulation allowed for innovation and 
experimentation.  Add-on insurance products present an excellent 
opportunity to test that claim. 
 
II.  THREE EXAMPLES OF ADD-ON INSURANCE 
 
In this part, we analyze three common forms of add-on insurance: 
extended warranties for consumer products, the loss or collision damage 
waivers sold with rental cars, and credit life insurance.  Extended 
warranties – and, in most cases, damage waivers – have negative value in 
expected utility terms because the losses they protect against are small and 
the price charged for the insurance is high relative to the expected value.  
Rational expected utility maximizers should not be risk averse at all over 
such small stakes.  Credit life insurance and, in some situations, damage 
waivers are a bad deal for slightly different reasons: The stakes can 
sometimes be high, and thus might be worth insuring; just not when the 
cost is so high relative to the expected value.  
 
A. EXTENDED WARRANTIES FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
 
An extended warranty is an optional contract that provides the 
purchaser with a longer period of protection from the failure of a specific 
product than the standard warranty offered by the manufacturer.16 Extended 
warranties differ fundamentally from the manufacturer’s warranties that 
are included in the price of a consumer product.  Manufacturers’ warranties 
 
16 There are allegations that some major retailers push extended warranties on 
products such as power tools that already come with manufacturer’s lifetime 
warranties. For example, Home Depot’s Ridgid Power tools come with a lifetime 
warranty from the manufacturer, yet some customers complain that they were 
nevertheless sold an extended warranty on the item. See, e.g., Scam Man, Rigid 
Extended Warranty Scam (Jun. 2, 2012, 2:06 AM), http://www.home 
depotsucks.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=11532#p13442 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2013) (“[m]ost of these ridged [sic] products are not eligible for an extended 
warranty because [sic] they have lifetime service agreement. yet home depot has 
the cashiers promp  [sic] you to buy them. shows you the greed of home depot and 
that is just one scam they do”). 
2013     BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS  9 
 
do have the potential to provide substantial value, but not primarily because 
of their insurance function.  Rather, the primary value of a manufacturer’s 
warranty lies in the quality signal it sends.  Consumers rationally conclude 
that the manufacturer would not offer a generous warranty if the product 
regularly failed within the warranty period and, thus, consumers 
appropriately prefer a product with a better manufacturer’s warranty.17  
An optional extended warranty, sold at an additional cost, does not 
signal high quality.  Indeed, our personal shopping experience suggests the 
opposite.  We have found that, once we have decided to buy a particular 
TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system at a retail establishment, 
the sales person who earnestly persuaded us of the high quality of the 
selected item disappears, and a “customer assistant” arrives with news of 
other disappointed customers whose very same TV/refrigerator/washing 
machine/sound system stopped working shortly after they bought them.  
Because the TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system might not 
actually be as good as it is supposed to be, the customer assistant explains, 
the store has arranged for an extended warranty that is available, at a small 
additional charge, to protect us from such disappointment.18 This extended 
warranty is pure insurance (and almost pure profit for the store).  For 
example, Business Week reported that extended warranties were 
responsible for 50% of Best Buy’s profits and almost 100% of Circuit 
City’s profits.19 
Data on extended warranties are difficult to come by.  As a result, 
there is very little empirical social science literature describing their 
workings, despite the frequent criticism of extended warranties by 
economists and consumer advocates.20 One recent estimate put the size of 
 
17 See generally George Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Warranty, 90 YALE 
L. J. 1297 (1981); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure 
and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).. 
18 This practice turns out to be so well documented in the extended warranty 
context that it has a name, at least in the UK: “double hitting.” Retailers “stressed 
to [the U.K. Competition Commission] the action they take to stop unacceptable 
selling practices, which they have told [the U.K.C.C.] would alienate customers.” 
COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 40.  The “unacceptable selling practices” 
include “double hitting,” providing “misleading information,” and “persisting in 
trying to sell an EW when the customer has declined the offer.” Id. 
19 Tao Chen, Ayay Kalra & Baohon Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended 
Service Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 611, 615 (2009) (using 2003 data from a 
large retailer in an expected utility framework that assumes that demographic and 
product characteristics affect the purchase of warranties through differences in risk 
aversion between consumers). 
20 For exceptions, see Pranav Jindal, Risk Preferences and Demand Drivers of 
Extended Warranties (Dec. 2012) (working paper) (on file with Smeal College of 
Business, Pennsylvania State University), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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this market at $16 billion,21 but that appears to be a largely impressionistic 
number, with no derivation given.  Better estimates are available for the 
UK – at least, for the consumer electric goods market – thanks to an 
investigation by the Competition Commission, which found that on total 
electric goods sales of £15-20 Billion in 2001, “18.5 million E[xtended] 
W[arrantie]s were supplied . . . .with a total value of nearly £900 million 
(including a valuation of free EWs), about 5% of total sales.”22  EWs were 
purchased by about one-third of all consumers who bought an electric good 
worth more than £50.23  Extrapolating those figures to the US yields a 
rough estimate of about $30 billion in electric goods sales in 2010, and 
about $1.4 billion in extended warranties sold for these types of products.24  
Extended warranties are also sold as add-ons to other products.  For 
example, the website Warranty Week estimated that the market for 
automobile extended warranties in the US represents another $11.2 
billion.25 
 
2196033 (using experimental data to decompose demand for extended warranties 
on washing machines as a function of risk, and loss, aversion); Chen, Kalra & Sun, 
supra note 19. Some economic theorists have modeled the market for extended 
warranties. See, e.g., Aidan Hollis, Extended Warranties, Adverse Selection, and 
Aftermarkets, 66 J. RISK & INS. 321 (1999) (surveying theoretical literature, and 
arguing on the basis of an adverse selection model that sellers of primary goods 
should not be able to exclude third-party extended warranties). At least in some 
contexts, extended warranties can be used to price-discriminate among consumers, 
even when buyers are rational, by increasing switching costs. See Edward 
Iacobucci, A Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 431 (2008). 
21 See Extended Warranties, WARRANTY WEEK, Nov. 21, 2006, available at 
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20061121.html (suggesting that the 
total extended warranty market was worth $16 Billion, but not specifying whether 
this is a stock measure of the value of warranties in force or an annualized flow). 
22 See COMPETITION COMM’N, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2003, at vol. 1. p. 3 (U.K.). The OFT recently estimated the 
total value of the same market as about £1 billion. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 
EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 24. 
23 COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 21, at 4. 
24See generally, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.4.5. Personal 
Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product (2013), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=70&Freq=Y
ear&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2009.  There is no precise US equivalent to the 
U.K. definition of household electric goods. We used Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Table 2.4.5, and included the categories Small Electric Household 
Appliances, Video & Audio Equipment, and Information Processing Equipment.  
See id.      
25 Vehicle Service Contract Administrators, Warranty Week (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20100909.html. 
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Extended warranties sold as an add-on to the purchase of a 
consumer product are, in expected utility terms, the paradigmatic bad 
insurance deal.26  They do not provide protection against any level of loss 
for which insurance at the prevailing price makes sense for a rational, 
expected-utility-maximizing individual.27  The reason is simple: a rational 
consumer cannot be risk-averse for losses that are so “small” relative to her 
overall wealth.  Classical risk-aversion only applies to large losses, those 
big enough to change the marginal utility of wealth.  And for almost 
anyone buying a $200 CD player or even a $1,000 TV set, the amount of 
potential loss – the replacement cost of the item in question – is likely to be 
quite small in relation to assets or lifetime wealth.  Even risk-averse 
consumers should be essentially risk-neutral for small-stakes gambles,28 
and recent survey research suggests that consumers in fact are risk neutral 
when it comes to extended warranties.29 
Consider a consumer who purchases a Sony 55" Class Bravia® 
EX620- Series LED LCD HDTV sold by Sears on line for $1619.99.30  
According to the Sears website, the extended warranty on this item – 
 
26 See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to 
Meet the Practice of Insurance, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial 
Services 1, 25-28 (Robert Liton & Richard Herring eds., 2004); Schwarcz, supra 
note 13; Rabin & Thaler, supra note 8. 
27 Except, possibly, for a purchaser who knows that she or he will use the 
product in an unusual manner that poses a high risk of product failure (but which is 
not considered misuse, voiding the warranty). The ability of such an individual to 
buy the warranty at the regular price represents a market failure, not a justification 
for the market. As the OFT observed, some have suggested that extended 
warranties may make more sense for liquidity constrained consumers, but there is 
no evidence that the purchase of extended warranties correlates with liquidity 
constraint. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 35. 
28 John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 
Econometrica 122, 122 (1964); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, 
Essays in The Theory of Risk Bearing, 90, 90-91 (1971); Rabin & Thaler, supra 
note 8.. 
29 See Jindal, supra note 20 (experimentally examining demand for extended 
warranties on washing machines and concluding that loss aversion, not risk 
aversion, explained the demand). 
30 See SEARS, http://www.sears.com/shc/s/p_10153_12605_05771742000P? 
blockNo=3&blockType=G3&prdNo=3&i_cntr=1314814734858 (last visited Aug. 
31, 2011). Sears does note that the price includes a manufacturer’s warranty for 
“Service & Support: Limited warranty - parts and labor - 1 year.”  Id. (Source 
shows a 3-yr warranty). 
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dubbed the “3 Year In-Home Master Protection Agreement” – costs an 
additional $39.31  
Table 1 evaluates the cost/benefit calculations for the extended 
warranty.  On reasonable assumptions about frequency and cost of repair, 
the warranty costs ten times more than its expected monetary value.  This 
calculation is conservative for at least two reasons.  First, we ignore 
discounting, meaning that we treat a dollar paid in the future identically to 
a dollar paid today (despite the fact that we know that people greatly prefer 
dollars today over dollars in the future).  Second, as Cutler & Zeckhauser 
point out, electronic goods tend to fall in price and increase in quality over 
time over time, with the result that the option to repair the product rather 
than junk it in favor of a better/cheaper model becomes increasingly less 
valuable.32 
  
 
31 No information about any warranty is available on the main web page 
described above. See id.  Only after you have “checked out” (clicked the button 
signifying that you wish to purchase the TV), are you informed about the 
possibility of an extended warranty.  See id.  This certainly constitutes an example 
of “shrouded” pricing.  Moreover, although you can choose not to buy the 
extended warranty, the default is that it is included; you have to check a “decline 
warranty” box to avoid paying for it. See id. Here is how Sears describes the 
warranty:  
 
Our coverage goes well beyond the original manufacturer’s 
warranty. No extra charge for covered repairs includes all parts 
and labor. Cosmetic defects are covered for the first 3 years. 
Schedule service day or night by calling 1-800-4-MY-HOME. 
Repairs are done by a force of more than 10,000 Authorized 
Sears Service Technicians, which means someone you can trust 
will be working on your products. Fast Help by Phone - we call 
it Rapid Resolution - provides you with non-technical and 
instructional assistance. Think of it as a talking owner's manual. 
It also includes rental reimbursement and a 25% discount on the 
purchase of consumable parts like filters and blades ordered from 
Sear Parts Direct (1-800-252-1698). An annual Preventive 
Maintenance check can be scheduled at the customer's request. 
The No Lemon Guarantee and Product Replacement includes 
delivery and installation if applicable. Coverage can be renewed 
and is transferable. 
 
 Id.  The “5 year in-home master protection Agreement” costs $519 (almost 1/3 the 
value of the TV set itself).  Id. 
32 Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 27. 
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Table 1: Extended Warranty Calculations 
Assumptions 
TV Lifetime 5 years
Lifetime probability of repair33 20%
Annual probability of repair 1 - (1-.2)1/5 = 4.3% 
Prob. of repair in 2 out-years  
(not covered by manufacturer’s warranty) 1 - (1-0.43)2 = 8.5% 
Cost of Repair34 $400 
Results 
Expected Value of Warranty 0.085×$400 = $34.16 
Cost of 3 year Warranty $349 
Cost/Expected Monetary Value ≈ 10/1 
 
 
B.  LOSS DAMAGE WAIVERS (LDWS) IN RENTAL CAR INSURANCE 
 
Insurance against damage to a rented car is a complex maze of 
overlapping contracts, state-by-state regulation (or lack thereof) and 
insurance law doctrines (subrogation, primary vs. secondary coverage, 
etc.).  The analytic problems are made worse by the absence of any 
consistent data on coverage or pricing.  Since Collision and Loss Damage 
Waivers are not considered insurance for purposes of insurance regulation 
(wrongly in our view), they are regulated separately if at all, and there 
appear to be no systematic data on terms or prices.35 
Under both CDWs and LDWs, the car owner (the car rental 
company) contracts with the renter to waive its right to be reimbursed for 
certain kinds of losses suffered while the renter has possession of the 
vehicle.  CDWs traditionally covered damage from collision only,36 while 
 
33Id. at Table 5. 
34 This is a guess. Doubling the guess would reduce the cost/expected value 
ratio to 5:1, exactly the same as that for the low deductible in the homeowners’ 
policy that Sydnor investigated. Recall that the risk aversion needed to explain that 
choice in expected utility terms would imply that the person would be unwilling to 
pay $1000 for a 50% chance to win $1 trillion. 
35 California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada and New York regulate C/LDWs by 
statute, apart from the ordinary insurance regulation mechanisms. 
36 LDW has been described as a descendant of CDW, which was “A more 
restrictive in that it waived the renter’s responsibility for vehicle damage only when 
the damage resulted from a collision with another vehicle or object. The broader LDW 
option relieves the renter from responsibility for damage that results from virtually 
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LDWs covered, in addition, damage from such things as vandalism or theft. 
But the terms now appear to be used somewhat loosely.37  For simplicity’s 
sake, we will refer to all such agreements as LDWs.  In essence, what the 
consumer buys with an LDW is the right to be free from any liability to the 
rental car company for any damage to the rented vehicle.  From the 
customer’s perspective this certainly feels like insurance, whether 
insurance law treats it as insurance as a technical matter or not. 
LDWs are typical add-on insurance products.  They are always 
priced separately from the car rental fee, and are presented to the customer 
after the baseline rental price has been announced.38  When shopping on-
line, for example, a typical setup is that the customer first inputs his or her 
rental location and dates.  A second screen then allows for a choice of 
vehicle, and a third screen gives a list of options, including the LDW and 
other add-ons such as a booster seat or GPS device.  In person, the 
transaction is typically structured much the same way – a baseline price is 
quoted, and once the renter has agreed to that price, she is then asked if she 
wants to “decline” the LDW by checking a box or series of boxes.39 
In part because LDWs are not sold or regulated as insurance, they are 
apparently only loosely-based on actuarial principles.40  Rental car companies 
 
any cause, including vandalism, theft, and glass breakage.” DENNIS STUTH, RENTAL 
CAR DECISIONS: WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW CAN HURT YOU 125 (2005). 
37 For example, Alamo’s self-described “Collision Damage Waiver” covers more 
than just collision damages. In it, Alamo agrees “to contractually waive [renter's] 
responsibility for all or part of the cost of damage to, loss or theft of the vehicle.”  See 
ALAMO, https://www.alamo.com/en_US/car-rental/reservation/start Reservation.html 
(complete online rental form filling in location as “Bradley Intl Arpt (BDL)”, date of 
trip, renters age as “25 and up,” then click “continue.”  On the next screen select a 
rental car by clicking “Add” next to one of the rental vehicles.  This will then bring 
you to a screen with available “Add-On” features which include a category called 
“Protection Products.”  Under the “Protection Products” category click the words 
“Collision Damage Waiver.”) (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
38 “It is a well-established sales principle that an individual is most susceptible 
to . . . upsell efforts [inducements to purchase add-ons] immediately after making 
the basic purchase decision.” STUTH, supra note 37, at 30. 
39 The purchase of the LDW, while optional, is structured as the default 
transaction, so that the renter has to make an affirmative choice not to buy the 
coverage. The renter is not asked whether she wishes to buy the LDW, but whether 
she wishes to “decline” it by checking a box to that effect. In that sense, the LDW 
is more “default-y” than an extended warranty, in which the consumer is asked to 
“buy,” rather than to “decline.” On the other hand, the initial quoted price does not 
include the LDW, which would give the LDW even more of a default structure. 
40 “In contrast to physical damage coverage . . . provided under a personal auto 
policy, the LDW daily rate is typically not actuarially based.” STUTH, supra note 
37, at 129. 
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obviously need to charge a rate that covers their average loss, but beyond that, 
the rate charged for a LDW is highly dependent on competitive factors.  It is 
not uncommon to find most car rental companies charging nearly the same 
LDW rate in a particular location.41  It is therefore difficult to arrive at a 
typical cost for LDWs sold nationwide.  Writing in 2005, industry insider 
Dennis Stuth suggested that rates ranged from $5 to $18 per day.42  That 
seems much too low in today’s market, however.  Using examples from 3 
cities and 3 different rental companies for a Toyota Corolla or similar car (see 
Table 2), we found prices for LDWs were in the range of $22-$28 per day, 
with an average of roughly $27.  Of course, this was a small and non-random 
sample (we were unable to uncover any systematic data on pricing), but a 
price of $25 per day seems like a reasonable estimate. 
 
Table 2: LDW & Car Rental Rates at Selected Airport Locations, June 26, 2012 
Car Rental  
Dates 
Location  
(Airport) 
Rental  
Company 
LDW 
Cost,  
per day 
Car Rental  
Base Rate 
Per day  
Midsize 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Avis $27.99 $67 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Hertz $28.99 $69 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Hartford Alamo $22.99 $66 
Midsize 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Avis $27.99 $40 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Hertz $28.99 $39 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Dallas Alamo $22.99 $31 
Midsize 7/3 - 7/8* Minneapolis Avis $27.99 $52 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Minneapolis Hertz $28.99 $54 
Corolla 6/26 - 7/1 Minneapolis Alamo $24.99 $56 
  Average:    $26.88 $52.56 
  Std. Dev.:   $2.38 $12.89         
Source: Rental company websites, visited 6/25/2012 
*No availability for 6/26-7/1; dates are 7/3-7/8  
Memo Item: MSRP for new Corolla = $17,980. 
 
How much should someone be willing to pay for a LDW? This is a 
difficult question to answer because it depends on a great many 
idiosyncratic factors, including the extent of coverage under the renter’s 
 
41Id. 
42Id.  
16 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.1 
 
own personal auto policy 43 and the credit card used to pay for the rental car 
in question.44  Some renters are already covered for some or all of the 
losses covered by a CDW.  For them, there is little or no point in buying 
additional coverage that duplicates what they already have.  At most, the 
LDW will function to reduce their effective deductible to zero.45  
Suppose, conservatively, that the renter has no prior coverage that 
would make the LDW unnecessary.  The renter would then be buying 
coverage for an otherwise uncovered loss, at the rate of $25 per day.  This 
works out to roughly $9,000 per year – far too much for a rational risk 
averse consumer to pay for coverage against harm to the vehicle.  
One way to see why the LDW is overpriced is to compare its cost 
with ordinary automobile insurance.  Typical automobile insurance covers 
vastly more than the LDW does (including, of course, liability to third 
parties, which could easily run many times the value of the insured vehicle 
itself), for far less money.  For example, the first author’s family auto 
policy, which covers three automobiles (including a 2013 Audi A6) and 
three adult drivers (one who is under 25), costs about $3,000 per year.  Of 
that total premium, the first party property insurance coverage costs only 
$1100.  By this metric, the LDW looks to be a very bad deal, since it covers 
less liability at many times the cost.46  
 
 43 Damage to a car rented by the policyholder is not covered under the 
standard Insurance Services Office PAP form, but some companies in some states 
do provide such coverage, which would make the C/LDW (almost) completely 
unnecessary. Even when damage to one’s rented car is already covered, there 
might be a small side benefit to buying an LDW; since the rental company’s loss 
would be waived, the renter would not need to turn to her or his insurer to cover it 
and would not risk an increased premium for having filed a claim. 
44 Some premium credit cards cover some kinds of losses (usually up to a 
relatively low limit) when a cardholder uses the card to rent a car. 
45 Even if someone is already covered by his or her own auto policy, STUTH, 
supra note 37, at 129, suggests that there might nevertheless be some reasons to 
purchase an LDW. These include: (a) Additional drivers: the renter’s own 
insurance might not cover a driver who is nevertheless authorized under the LDW; 
and (b) Subrogation hassles: When the renter relies on his or her own insurer to 
cover any losses, the car rental company typically charges the renter for the losses, 
and then forces the renter to collect from his or her insurer. See id. at 130-31. This 
may involve considerable time and expense that would be saved by purchasing a 
LDW. Although they are not zero, these benefits seem very small for the typical 
rental car customer, and we ignore them. 
46 The moral hazard resulting from the LDW might lead rental drivers to 
behave more dangerously and get into more accidents than they would when 
driving their own cars. In turn, this might conceivably drive up the cost of the 
LDW relative to ordinary insurance on an owned vehicle. But it is difficult to 
imagine that rental drivers are so much more reckless than drivers of their own 
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A more standard way to think about the attractiveness of a LDW is 
to compare its cost to its expected payout (as we did in Table 1).  
Estimating the expected payout of a LDW is complicated, however, absent 
data on loss amounts and probabilities.  Table 3 presents some back-of-the-
envelope calculations.  We assume that loss amounts are uniformly 
distributed in various ranges or “bins,” and somewhat arbitrarily assign 
probabilities to each range.  
 
Table 3: Back-of-the-Envelope Estimate for Expected Annual Loss, Corolla LDW 
Loss Amount Loss Probability Expected Loss 
$0-$100 52.0% $26 
$101-$500 26.0% $78 
$501-$1,000 13.0% $98 
$1001-$10,000 6.5% $358 
$10,001-$18,000 2.5% $238 
TOTAL 100.0% $797 
Cost of LDW $9000 
Ratio: Cost/Expected Benefit  11.3:1 
 
Despite its crudity, the estimated expected loss in Table 3 is an 
order of magnitude smaller than the annual cost of a LDW, even with 
conservative (i.e., generous) assumptions about loss probabilities.  As with 
the extended warranty, a LDW looks to be a very bad deal for the 
consumer.  Expedia’s alternative loss damage waiver plan starts at $9 per 
day; that’s still not worth buying in expected utility terms, but it is less than 
half the price of the rental car companies’ LDW.47 
However, the calculations here are somewhat more complicated 
than in the case of the extended warranty.  The reason is that although the 
expected loss in this context is, at about $800, arguably quite small, there is 
 
cars, especially since so many renters have coverage for their own vehicles that 
largely mimics that of the LDW. 
47 Car Rental Insurance, EXPEDIA, http://www.expedia.com/daily/promos/ 
travel_protection_plans/car_rental.asp?opt=1_7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). The 
program was designed and administered for Expedia, Inc.’s clients by Berkely and 
is underwritten by Stonebridge Casualty Insurance Company. Id. In California, 
Berkely is a service mark of Aon Direct Insurance Administrators; in all other 
states Berkely is a division of Affinity Insurance Services, Inc. except AIS Affinity 
Insurance Agency, Inc. in Minnesota and Oklahoma, and AIS Affinity Insurance 
Agency in New York. Id. The website is interactive, but will not give you a quote 
unless you actually rent a car. 
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some chance of a much larger loss.  If an $18,000 loss represents a non-
trivial fraction of lifetime wealth, then risk aversion may come into play, 
and the cost/benefit analysis needs to take account of the gains from 
substituting a certain payment for an uncertain loss amount.  Such 
calculations were per se unnecessary in the case of extended warranties 
covering small losses. 
So, could risk aversion be enough to justify the high premiums 
charged for a LDW? The short answer is “No.”  We can reframe the issue 
of whether the LDW is overpriced by asking how much more than the 
actuarially fair value of the loss a risk averse consumer would be willing to 
pay as insurance against that loss, given assumptions about her wealth, the 
probability and size of the loss, and her degree of risk aversion.48  This 
“excess premium” can then be compared to the actual premium charged for 
the LDW.  We assume utility has the widely-used Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) form.49  
Kenneth Arrow has argued that on theoretical grounds a CRRA 
coefficient of about 1.0 (logarithmic utility) should be reasonable; a 
coefficient of 50 is extraordinarily risk averse.  Yet as the last row of Table 
4 reveals, even an absurdly risk averse individual, with a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 50, should at most be willing to pay only $1,000 
more than the fair premium (of $2,000) to insure against a 10% chance of a 
$20,000 loss.  That is, the most such an individual should be willing to pay 
for insurance against this loss is about $3000, since anything more than this 
would make going uninsured the more attractive option.  For more 
reasonable levels of risk aversion, the maximum premium is between 
$2,036 and $2,330.  Of course, these are all far less than the roughly $9,000 
premium charged for a LDW by rental car companies and less than the 
$4,300 premium charged through Expedia. 
 
 
48 To do this, we find the expected utility of the consumer who purchases no 
insurance and faces an uncertain prospect – a gamble. We then determine the 
certainty equivalent wealth – defined as the wealth (held with certainty) that gives 
the same utility as the gamble does. 
49 We use the standard CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function 
of the form  , the limit of which, as ρ approaches 1, is U(W) = ln(W). 
According to Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Modeling Competition 
and Market Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical Issues, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 146, 
147,(May 2008), “constant relative risk aversion provides a reasonably good 
approximation of individual attitude toward risk, at least in an expected utility 
setting.”  Somewhat arbitrarily, we set wealth equal to $500,000. 
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Table 4: Maximum Willingness to Pay for a LDW as function of Risk Aversion 
Assumptions 
Wealth, W $500,000
Probability of Loss, p 10%
Loss Amount, L $20,000
Fair Premium $2,000
 Coefficient of Constant Relative Risk Aversion, ρ 
 1* 2 10 50 
Certainty Equivalent 
Wealth50 $481,963 $481,925 $481,668 $480,885 
Maximum Excess 
Premium $36.54 $75.00 $332.00 $1,115.00 
*The CRRA utility function is defined as ln(W) when ρ = 1. 
 
These results make it all the more surprising that, according to one 
rental car insurance expert, 19% of renters always bought an LDW and 
another 19% sometimes did.51 
 
C. CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE 
 
Arthur Morris invented the modern version of credit life insurance 
in the US in 1917.52  Borrowers purchase credit life insurance to guarantee 
 
50 The certainty equivalent wealth is the amount of risk-free wealth that 
provides the same utility as the expected utility resulting from the gamble under 
consideration. In this context, the gamble consists of wealth of $500,000, a loss of 
$10,000, a probability of loss of 10%, and utility function characterized by a given 
degree of risk aversion.  Since the individual dislikes risk, he is willing to pay 
more than the $1,000 expected loss to avoid it.  The difference between 
($500,0000 minus the certainty equivalent) and $1,000 represents the maximum 
excess premium the individual would be willing to pay, and this amount rises as 
risk aversion increases. 
51 STUTH, supra note 37, at 132 (quoting a 2002 survey performed by the 
Progressive group of insurance companies). Of those who bought, 63% said they 
did so because they wanted extra protection, but 24% said they bought because 
they weren’t sure whether their PAPs covered the loss and 8% said they bought 
because the agent pressured them into doing so.  Id.  
52 Arthur J. Morris, The Origins of Credit Life Insurance, 1957 INS. L.J. 329, 
329; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that 
Morris’ purpose was to allow the extension of credit to workers with no security or 
collateral). It’s worth noting that the practice of buying life insurance to benefit 
creditors is much older than this. See generally GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON 
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that if they die before repaying a particular outstanding debt (e.g., a 
mortgage or a car loan), the insurer will repay the lender.  Closely related 
products such as credit health or credit disability work in much the same 
way, except that they are triggered by an event other than the death of the 
insured.  The volume of credit life insurance sold in the US was about $770 
million in 2010; credit accident and health insurance amounted to an 
additional $875 million.53  Credit life is typically sold as an add-on to the 
financing of a primary purchase (a house, car, or other substantial 
consumer durable), by the entity making (or financing) the original sale – 
the car dealership, retailer, etc.54  
The first thing to note about credit life insurance is that it does not 
directly protect the borrower, her estate, or her heirs.  The primary 
beneficiary (in a legal and economic sense) is the lender, who is protected 
 
LIVES (1999) (describing the culture of life insurance in England from 1695 to 
1775).  Morris’s innovation was extending the link between credit and life 
insurance to a mass market in a context in which the creditor did not require the 
debtor to purchase the insurance. 
53 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE AND CREDIT 
ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIENCE 2006-2010, 4 (2011).  The roughly 
30% drop in the volume of net written premiums between 2008 and 2010 
presumably reflects the effects of the recession and the decline in overall 
consumption expenditures. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there has been a clear 
downward trend in the volume of both credit life and credit accident/health since 
2001, with a drop-off of 62% over this period.  Id.  Patricia McCoy points out to us 
that under the National Bank Act, national banks are authorized to underwrite and 
sell insurance substitutes called “debt cancellation contracts” and “debt suspension 
agreements.”  12 C.F.R. § 37.1(a) (2013).  It is possible that the drop in credit life 
and credit accident insurance reflects a growth in the market for close substitutes – 
debt cancellation/suspension contracts.  See Barnett, Sivon & Natter, P.C. and 
McIntyre & Lemon, P.L.L.C., Debt Cancellation Contracts and Debt Suspension 
Agreements, AM. BANKERS ASS’N (May 23, 2012), http://www.aba.com/ABIA/ 
Documents/36a3b8296aef4474b90d3e3f9a8896feGAODebtCancellationCoalition
Final2810conformed.pdf, for an overview of these contracts from the perspective 
of the Debt Cancellation Coalition, of which the American Bankers Insurance 
Association is an ex officio participant. 
54 We lack data for the US, but a UK Competition Commission report suggests 
that stand-alone sales of Protection Payment Insurance (PPI) “are very small 
compared to the total number of PPI policies sold by distributors . . . . [T]he stand-
alone market accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of total P[ersonal]L[oan]PPI sales, 
and less than 0.1 per cent of total C[redit]C[ard]PPI sales. . . . [Even at] a little 
under 9 per cent…, the extent of M[ortgage]PPI policies sold on a stand-alone 
basis is still very small.” Market Investigation into Payment Protection Insurance, 
COMPETITION COMM’N, 56-57 (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2009/fulltext/542.pdf. We strongly suspect the 
same is true for the US. 
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from the risk that the debtor dies before repaying the loan and the estate 
cannot repay it.55  It is true, however, that the purchase of credit life 
insurance does reduce or eliminate the risk of foreclosure if the 
borrower/insured dies.  Some borrowers may want to leave the asset free 
and clear to their heirs, or may worry that the heirs can’t afford the 
remaining obligations under the loan and would be forced to give up the 
asset whose purchase the loan originally financed.  
Thus, there are circumstances under which credit life insurance 
may provide benefits for the purchaser.  Suppose the wage-earning spouse 
buys a car for $15,000, financing it with a loan secured by the car.  If the 
borrower dies before the car loan has been repaid and the surviving spouse 
cannot make the remaining payments, the lender can take back the car; and 
if the remaining debt is less than the car’s resale value, the lender can come 
after the estate for the rest of what’s owed.  Thus, there is a risk that one’s 
survivor will have to repay the loan, and this risk does impinge on the 
utility of the person buying the insurance, thereby providing at least a 
superficially plausible motivation for buying credit life insurance.  Credit 
life replaces the payments remaining at the time of the borrower’s death, 
eliminating the risk that the deceased’s estate will have to make those 
payments. 
Credit life insurance is thus different from extended warranties and 
many LDWs for two reasons.  First, the amounts at stake in credit life 
insurance can sometimes be large enough relative to overall wealth that a 
rational consumer might conceivably find insuring these risks attractive.  
That is generally not the case with extended warranties and LDWs 
(especially for a renter who has a personal auto policy with collision 
coverage), where the size of the risks involved is so much smaller.  Second, 
the value of credit life depends not only on the insured’s risk aversion, but 
also on his altruistic concern for the welfare of his beneficiaries, which 
 
55 The lender has many other ways of protecting against this risk, of course, 
beginning with charging a higher interest rate to reflect the risk that the borrower 
would die before the loan was repaid. Note that the moral hazard problem with 
higher interest rates – that they induce borrowers to take on riskier projects – does 
not seem applicable in the context of credit life insurance. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & 
Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 393, 401 (June 1981) (suggesting that when lenders can’t observe 
borrower behavior, higher interest rates will lead buyers to substitute towards 
riskier projects).  Indeed, one plausible explanation for the existence of credit life 
insurance is that it offers a legal way to charge risky borrowers a higher interest 
rate, without running afoul of usury laws.  Lenders often require collateral as an 
additional means of protection. 
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makes it more difficult for an outside observer to be certain when credit life 
insurance is a bad deal for an individual purchaser.56  
Under ideal circumstances, credit life offers a way for borrowers to 
protect their survivors against the risk of having the borrower’s estate 
drained by paying off a loan after the borrower dies.  As many have noted, 
credit life is not a particularly good way to manage this risk – ordinary life 
insurance, if it is available, is typically both dramatically cheaper and more 
flexible, since proceeds are not dedicated to repayment of a particular 
loan.57  This flexibility is especially valuable when the deceased borrower’s 
estate is insolvent or if the loan is non-recourse.  In either case, the debtor’s 
family or other chosen beneficiary, not the creditor, gets the money, surely 
the result that is more consistent with the altruistic justification for the 
purchase of life insurance. 
Moreover, some versions of credit life are even less defensible. For 
instance, many subprime mortgages were sold with so-called “Single 
Premium Credit Life,” in which the total premium for the life of the policy 
is rolled into the initial mortgage.  This meant that:  
 
The borrower then pa[id] interest on this amount for the 
life of the loan and typically ha[d] not even begun reducing 
the loan’s principal balance by the time the five-year credit 
life insurance coverage period expire[d]. Consequently, 
when a borrower move[d] or refinance[d] out of a 
subprime loan after five years, all of the premiums for the 
 
56 That is, credit life – and indeed all life insurance – does not pay the insured, 
but rather his or her beneficiaries.  Their utility matters to the insured, but only 
indirectly.  Thus, although we can place plausible bounds on risk aversion, we 
cannot as readily put bounds on altruism (as measured by sources outside of 
insurance demand).  For an attempt to do so using insurance data, see B. Douglas 
Bernheim, How Strong are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the 
Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 900 (1991), 
concluding that “most individuals are in part motivated by a desire to leave 
bequests.” 
57 Many sources note that if it’s available, ordinary life insurance is typically a 
much cheaper way to cover the risk that credit life also insures against.  See, e.g., 
Credit Insurance, WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.wdfi.org/ymm/brochures/ 
credit/credit_insurance.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (suggesting that “credit 
insurance is expensive in comparison to other forms of insurance” and offering a 
chart showing that a typical policyholder, age 30 and in good health, could expect 
to pay $342 per year for $50,000 of credit life insurance, while the same amount of 
term life – which of course pays cash, and is not restricted to the repayment of a 
particular debt – would cost only $70, only one-fifth as much).  
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terminated insurance [were] . . . stripped directly out of the 
borrower’s home equity.58 
 
Financing the entire credit life premium, rather than paying it month-by-
month, thus worked out to be a very poor deal for virtually every consumer.  
Many other credit life practices have been highly criticized for over 
50 years.  Among the abuses discussed in a report by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners report in 197059 were: excessive 
coverage (selling coverage for more than the amount borrowed), failure to 
refund unearned premiums when the debt was paid earlier than required, 
coercive selling practices, bad faith claims-adjusting, failures to inform the 
policyholder of coverage,60 overcharging, and a host of other practices. 
While regulatory changes beginning in the 1960s attempted to restrict the 
most blatant of these abuses,61 their efficacy is unclear, and at least some of 
these practices continue in some jurisdictions. 
Rather than focusing on the worst practices, however, it’s better to 
consider a typical policy. Unfortunately, data on a “typical” product are not 
easy to come by,62 but the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions 
furnishes the details of one assertedly representative example.63  Using this 
example, supplemented by some actuarial data, we can do a very 
conservative back-of-the-envelope calculation on the payback from an 
average credit life insurance policy, as summarized in Table 5.  
 
 
58 ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING 
5 (2001), available at http://www.selegal.org/Cost%20of%20Predatory%20 
Lending.pdf.  Under bans from state regulators and pressure from public opinion, 
the worst of these practices were abandoned by most sub-prime lenders in the mid-
2000’s. 
59 For an extensive discussion, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra 
note 1, at 39-52. 
60 Borrowers were sometimes sold policies bundled with the primary loan, 
and were not even informed that they were being charged for coverage. In such 
cases, the estate of a borrower who died would not know to make a claim on the 
insurer. 
61 NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 52-87. 
62 This in itself is interesting. Much as Daniel Schwarcz found with home 
insurance, it appears to be very difficult to shop for credit life insurance on-line, 
see Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1263 (2011): we were not able to uncover any recent rate quotes or sample 
policies. 
63 WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 57.   
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Table 5: Hypothetical Credit Life Valuation 
Assumptions: 
Male, 35  Sex, Age 
$15,000  Amount of car loan 
4  Years to repay 
$2,917  Interest/finance charges64 
$265  Cost of credit life 
$8,172  Average Balance owed at death, if death occurs65 
0.00175  Annual probability of death66 
0.0072  Total probability of death during 4 year life of loan 
Results: 
$58.84  Expected balance owed at death 
$20.98  Expected interest/finance charge67 
$79.82  Total Expected Payout from Credit Life 
 Ratio: Premium Cost/Expected Payout = 3.3:168 
 
Suppose a 35-year-old male in average health borrows $15,000 to 
purchase a car, with no down payment.  According to the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions, a typical credit life insurance policy 
costs the borrower $265.  That amount protects an average balance owed – 
 
64 Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes an effective annual interest rate of 9.4%. 
65 Assumes that if the borrower dies, on average, it will be at month 24, 
halfway through the life of the loan.  (We inflate the value of credit life insurance 
by not discounting future cash flows to present value. Were this amount to be 
discounted to its present value – as seems appropriate – it would be 20 percent 
smaller.) 
66 Source: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html for annual death 
probabilities.  
67 Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes that the entire stream of interest 
payments are protected by credit life, which implies that the appropriate number is 
$2,917 x 0.0072 = $20.98. But this is clearly conservative.  A borrower who dies at 
month 24 owes only the interest on the remaining balance outstanding, which is 
roughly one-half of the total interest.  (Again, since the interest would have been 
paid over the 24 months following the borrower’s death, the present value of the 
remaining interest payments, as of the date of death is only $797.80, when 
discounted at the borrowing rate of 9.4 percent. That amount discounted to the date 
the loan is signed is only $667). 
68 With appropriate discounting of principal and interest payments insured by 
credit life, this ratio would be about 5:1. 
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over the 48-month life of the loan – of $8,170.  The average 35-year-old 
male stands a 0.72% (0.0072) chance of dying before age 39.  Even 
assuming that the entire interest and finance charges would still be owed if 
the borrower died, the purchase of credit life insurance would prevent an 
expected monetary loss of only $79.82.  Of course, one should not expect 
that premiums would be equal to the expected payout, since such 
actuarially-fair pricing could not cover any of the other costs associated 
with running the insurance company.  But at just over three to one, the ratio 
of expected payout to premium cost is extraordinarily low: not as low as 
the ten to one ratios for extended and damage waivers but still much too 
low to result from anything approaching rational behavior.  Only someone 
who assigns astronomically high value to the wealth or consumption of his 
heirs should find this kind of ratio appealing.  Even then, as noted earlier, 
there are typically much cheaper ways to protect against this kind of risk 
than through credit life.  
Further proof of the problematic nature of credit life comes from 
data on industry loss ratios, which are calculated by dividing incurred 
losses by earned premiums.69  According to state-by-state data compiled by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 2009, the 
loss ratio on credit life insurance averaged 44.1% for the US as a whole in 
the period 2003-2007.70  Louisiana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Nevada 
all had loss ratios below 33%, and even the best states – Virginia, New 
York and Vermont – had loss ratios of only about 55%.  Compared with a 
loss ratio of over 90% for group life insurance,71 it’s pretty clear that credit 
life purchasers are not getting a good return for the premiums they pay.  
These low loss ratios continue, despite the NAIC’s proclamation, in 1959, 
of a resolution that “provided that any loss ratio for credit life insurance 
 
69 If a credit life insurer pays out $100 in losses in a given year and collects 
$150 in premiums, its loss ratio is 2/3.  From a consumer’s perspective, the higher 
the loss ratio, the better, other things equal.  Low loss ratios suggest that the 
premiums consumers pay are too high relative to the coverage they receive for 
incurred losses.  (An actuarially-fair product would have a loss ratio of 1, which 
would of course leave no room to cover expenses.) 
70 This is the weighted five-year aggregated loss ratio, using states’ credit life 
losses as weights and was computed from data in NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
supra note 52.  Using a shorter 3-year window does not make a substantial 
difference. The standard deviation of the loss ratio across states was 8.6%. 
71 The highly profitable nature of credit life is underscored by the virtual 
absence of any underwriting requirements for such policies.  See, e.g., 
UsLifeCredit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) 
(failing to ask about policyholder’s medical history did not bar recovery by 
insured’s estate, even though policyholder knew she had cancer when she applied 
for credit life policies). 
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below 50 percent would be considered to produce an excessive rate,”72 and 
despite many attempts to enforce such a minimum over the succeeding 50 
years. 
To recap: credit life looks to be a bad deal for consumers for 
several reasons.  First, even in principle, it’s not clear why borrowers 
should want it, although a strong bequest motive could explain some of the 
demand for credit life.  Second, there are often substantially cheaper ways 
of covering the same risks covered by credit life.  Third, the worst versions 
of credit life are virtually certain losers for the insured, and even average 
policies look to be a bad deal, unless consumers place extraordinarily high 
value on protecting their heirs.  Finally, the very low ratio of claims paid to 
premiums collected implies that consumers are not getting enough back for 
their premium dollars, especially as compared to widely available 
alternatives.  
 
III. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF ADD-ON INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS 
 
The add-on insurance market poses two challenges to the standard 
economic analysis of insurance markets.  First, the add-on insurance 
market largely consists of expensive insurance against relatively small 
losses, a combination that is unequivocally bad for consumers in expected 
utility terms.  Second, sellers are able to sell the insurance at prices that far 
exceed the cost, notwithstanding what appears to be a robustly competitive 
market for the product or service to which the insurance is connected.  
Extended warranties clearly pose both of these challenges.  The 
damage waiver and credit life insurance situations are a bit more 
complicated.  For a car renter with a personal auto insurance policy that 
includes collision coverage, a damage waiver functions simply to reduce 
the collision deductible to zero and, thus, is economically equivalent to an 
extended warranty – providing high cost insurance for small losses.  But a 
car renter who does not have other collision coverage does face a small risk 
of a modest loss.  Similarly, credit life insurance benefits can easily pay off 
in amounts that represent real money.  These kinds of losses might barely 
be worth insuring, just not at the prices prevailing in the add-on insurance 
context. 
In this Part we set out the behavioral economic explanation of why 
consumers like these products and why sellers can charge such high prices 
for the insurance, even in what appears to be a competitive market.  We 
note that scholars and regulators have been skeptical about credit life for 
 
72 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 69. 
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similar reasons since at least the 1950s,73 so the behavioral critique is not 
new in spirit, even if some of the substance is novel.   
 
A.  THE APPEAL OF INSURANCE AGAINST SMALL LOSSES 
 
We begin by reviewing why insurance against small losses is 
generally a bad deal in expected utility terms.74  The explanation begins by 
assuming that people are risk averse and that it is this risk aversion that 
motivates insurance.75   Risk aversion can be understood as a consequence 
of the declining marginal utility of money (meaning that people derive less 
benefit from each additional dollar that they possess).  Insurance reduces 
financial risk by taking money from people, in the form of premiums, 
during times when the marginal utility of that money is comparatively low 
(they need it less, because they have more of it) and giving them money, in 
the form of claim payments, at times when their marginal utility for that 
money is high (they need it more because they have less of it, owing to the 
loss).  Thus, a rational, risk-averse person should be willing to pay more 
than the expected value of a future financial loss to prevent that loss from 
occurring.  
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, people 
would completely insure against all risks for which they could purchase 
fairly-priced insurance.  Of course the real world is very different. For 
present purposes, the key difference is transaction costs.  Insurers have to 
charge customers more than the present value of the expected loss, because 
insurers have to pay their employees, the rent on their headquarters, and so 
forth.  
Insurance is a good deal in expected utility terms when the 
additional utility attributable to risk aversion exceeds the transaction costs 
and profits embedded in the insurance premiums.  Other things equal, 
insurance that protects people from losses that are large in relation to their 
income and other assets is more valuable than insurance against small 
losses, because insurance against large losses provides a bigger marginal 
 
73 See sources cited supra note 1.  
74 The uselessness of insurance for small losses is analyzed in detail in the 
sources cited supra note 8.  
75 There might be other motivations for purchasing insurance aside from 
classical risk aversion.  For an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER 
ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE 
MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013).  For a brief survey, see, e.g., TOM 
BAKER & PETER SIEGELMAN, Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The 
Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds.) (forthcoming 
2014). 
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utility boost.  Conversely, higher transaction costs or profits make 
insurance less valuable, because less of the premiums go to pay loss costs.  
Most add-on insurance products are a bad deal on both of these dimensions.  
The losses covered by add-on insurance tend to be small in relation to 
consumer assets.  Moreover, the extra amount that consumers pay for the 
risk spreading services provided by add-on insurance is very high in 
relation to other kinds of insurance.76  
Consider, as a useful point of comparison, the choice of deductible 
in homeowners’ insurance. Should a consumer choose a policy with a $250 
deductible, a $500 deductible, or a $1000 deductible?  Choosing a low 
deductible in a homeowners’ insurance policy is, from an expected utility 
perspective, similar to buying an add-on insurance product that provides a 
comparable amount of financial protection.  (That is, choosing the $250 
deductible instead of the $500 deductible is just buying an additional 
insurance policy that covers losses in the range of $250-$500, at a cost 
given by the difference between the two coverage plans.)  Recent excellent 
research by Justin Sydnor precisely identifies the cost and expected benefit 
of different deductibles in the homeowners’ insurance context, 
demonstrating that expected utility theory cannot explain why consumers 
choose low deductibles.77  This analysis is directly applicable to add-on 
insurance products.  
Importantly, however, the institutional context in which consumers 
choose the size of their insurance deductible differs significantly from that 
in which consumers choose whether to buy an add-on insurance product.  
As we will see, this difference in context nicely sets up the behavioral 
economic explanation for sustained high profits in add-on insurance (and 
the absence of such excess profits in low deductible insurance). 
Sydnor uses data from a large homeowners’ insurer to demonstrate 
that a substantial majority of consumers choose a deductible that is 
dramatically too small to be justified by any reasonable level of risk 
aversion or future expected claims.  For example, many consumers choose 
a $500 deductible, rather than the $1,000 deductible they might have 
picked instead.  The $500 deductible policy costs about $100 more than the 
$1000 deductible policy.  Given typical claiming rates, the average 
expected monetary benefit from the additional coverage is about $20.  This 
means that consumers pay $100 to receive an expected $20 monetary 
 
76 Strictly speaking, not all that extra amount is a “transaction cost” as that 
term is used in economics.  A significant amount is profit.  For present purposes, 
this detail does not matter. 
77 Justin Snydor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., 
Oct. 2010, at 177, 178 (showing that among the consumers insured by the 
company that provided the data, 83% choose a deductible that was too low). 
2013     BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS  29 
 
benefit.78  That is not as bad as the ten to one ratio we found in extended 
warranties and damage waivers, but it is worse than the three to one ratio in 
credit life insurance.79   
To justify the lower deductible on risk aversion grounds, a rational 
consumer would need to have a utility function that was so astronomically 
risk-averse that she or he would almost-literally never be able to get out of 
bed.80  As we discussed earlier, risk aversion varies across individuals, and 
depends – somewhat loosely speaking and in very abstract terms – on the 
curvature of the individual’s utility function in wealth/utility space, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality 
 
 
 
A highly risk averse person such as A (represented by the solid 
curve) has a marginal utility of wealth that declines very rapidly as her 
wealth increases (a highly-bowed utility function in wealth/utility space).  
Conversely, someone such as person C, who is completely risk neutral, has 
 
78 Id. at 196.  
79 Recall that using more realistic assumptions produced a 5:1 ratio for credit 
life insurance, right in line with Sydnor’s 5:1 ratio for the low deductible.  See 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
80 Rabin and Thaler, supra note 8, at 226-27. 
Flat Slope = Low Marginal 
Utility of Wealth 
Steep Slope = High Marginal 
Utility of Wealth 
Wealth
Utility A’s Utility 
 
B’s Utility 
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a constant marginal utility of wealth (a straight-line utility function 
represented by the dotted line in Figure 1).   Person B (represented by the 
dashed curve) is more risk averse than C, but less-so than A, since B’s 
marginal utility declines more slowly than A’s as wealth increases.  
 As we explained, economists use a quantitative measure, called 
the “coefficient of risk aversion” to estimate the curvature of the utility 
function and hence, to measure an individual’s degree of risk aversion.81  
Empirical studies estimate plausible values for the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion to be in the single digit range, i.e. from 0 (risk neutral) to 9.82  
Buying the lower deductible is a rational economic decision only if one’s 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly (and astoundingly) high: 
between 1,840 and 5,064.  Someone with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 5000 would turn down a bet that offered a 50/50 chance of 
either losing $1,000 or gaining any amount of money (including, say 
$1,000,000,000,0000).83  
Why do so many people – for example, about 25% of the 
purchasers of consumer electronics in the UK84 and 19% of car renters in 
the US85 – buy something that is such a bad deal in expected utility terms?  
Camerer et al. describe one hypothesis in evocative terms. People who buy 
extended warranties are cognitively challenged “Homer Simpsons,” who 
mistakenly think the warranties are a good deal, perhaps because they 
overestimate the cost of a repair or the frequency with which products fail 
and misunderstand the value of insurance against such relatively small 
losses.86  We will call this the “mistaken calculator” hypothesis.  The 
 
81 The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as ′′ / ′ , 
where U″ is the second derivative of the utility function and U′ is the first 
derivative, evaluated at some given wealth level W.  This is the so-called 
“Arrow/Pratt” measure of risk aversion.  See Arrow, supra note 8, at 94-95; Pratt, 
supra note 8, at 123, 135-36.  Informed readers will realize that we are finessing a 
conceptually important issue, since risk aversion is measured only at a given point 
along an individual’s utility function. 
82 Syndnor, supra note 77 at 178. 
83 Id. at 190, Table 3. 
84 See U.K. Competition Comm’n, supra note 3, at 4; Chen et al., supra note 
19, at 615 (explaining that 31% of consumers in their data purchased an extended 
warranty during their observation period at one U.S. retailer and that extended 
warranties “constitute approximately 33% of all purchase occasions,” suggesting 
that some people bought more than one). 
85 Stuth, supra n. 37 at 132. 
86 See Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1254 n.144, writes that, 
 
[I]n a classic Simpsons episode, Homer was having a crayon 
hammered into his nose to lower his I.Q. (Don't ask.) The writers 
indicated the lowering of his I.Q. by having Homer make ever 
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behavioral decision research suggests a second hypothesis, under which 
consumers buy the warranties as an emotional risk management device that 
reflects their (irrational but real) aversion to both loss and regret, and their 
mental accounting.  
 
1. Emotional Risk Management 
 
Behavioral economics offers a variety of potential explanations for 
preferring low deductibles and other forms of excessive insurance.  We 
begin with regret aversion, which involves the present recognition that we 
will in the future evaluate our past decisions based on what actually 
happened, rather than (as in the expected utility analysis) based exclusively 
on what it was possible for us to know at the moment a decision is made.87  
Michael Braun and Alexander Muermann developed a model for insurance 
demand that adds regret aversion to the expected utility calculation and 
conclude that regret aversion leads otherwise rational actors to “hedge their 
bets” by buying insurance for low value losses.88  
Regret aversion interacts with “mental accounting” – putting 
money into different mental categories with different emotional or other 
values – when people buy insurance against small losses, especially when 
that purchase is combined with another purchase, sometimes called 
“reference pricing.”89  The add-on insurance premium is categorized as an 
 
stupider statements. The surgeon knew the operation was 
complete when Homer finally exclaimed: “Extended Warranty! 
How can I lose?” 
 
Several readers pointed out that there is no need to put “cognitively challenged” in 
front of “Homer Simpson,” but we are aware that not all readers are as familiar 
with Homer Simpson. 
87 Following a classic article, regret is associated with having made a choice 
that works out badly.  In their terms, “compare the sensation of losing £100 as a 
result of an increase in income tax rates, which you could have done nothing to 
prevent, with the sensation of losing £100 on a bet on a horse race.”  Graham 
Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational 
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 808 (1982). 
88 See Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the 
Demand for Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737 (2004).  Although this is not relevant 
to the present analysis, regret aversion leads people to buy less insurance than they 
should for severe but infrequent losses. 
89 See Pranav Jindal, supra note 20 at 6, 16 (providing an explanation and test 
for “reference pricing” in the extended warranty context); Richard H. Thaler, 
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCIENCE 199 (1985).  
See also Viviana Zelizer, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1995).  Our favorite 
example is Orly Ashenfelter’s explanation of how to use mental accounting to 
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increase in “cost” rather than as a “loss,” making the premium payment less 
painful.  By contrast, the financial consequences of the potentially 
insurable future event are categorized as a loss and over-weighted because 
of the emotional distress associated with loss.90  
As Eric Johnson and his collaborators first fully explained in the 
insurance context in 1993, people experience gains and losses from a 
reference point.  People value the first dollar of a gain the most and each 
additional dollar of gain less.  At the same time, people hate the first dollar 
of a loss more than any additional dollar.  In other words, they have a 
declining marginal disutility of loss that mirrors their declining marginal 
utility of gains.  That means that people often will pay dearly to avoid a 
small “loss.”  In the add-on insurance context, they pay what feels like a 
small additional cost to avoid the emotional distress associated with a 
larger future loss. 
Behavioral economics offers several other explanations for add-on 
insurance products.  The availability heuristic – judging an event’s 
probability by a particularly vivid example of that event – surely affects the 
purchase of all three of our examples.91  The endowment effect – loosely, 
the tendency of people to prefer what they “have” just because they have it 
– likely impacts the purchase of extended warranties, and may explain why 
people buy the warranty once they bought the product, even though they 
 
drink great wine for nothing: buy cases as an “investment” and then pay nothing 
when you later drink a bottle.  
90 Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 42. 
91 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153 (4th ed. 2007). See 
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).  In 
the add-on insurance context, the availability heuristic could lead purchases to 
generalize from the examples of product failure, accidents, or death provided by 
the salesman to conclude that the likelihood of those events occurring was much 
larger than they, in fact are.  In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan (personal 
communication) put the point this way:  
 
Dropping your iPhone, toppling your television, spilling water 
on your laptop – these are events that are really easy to imagine. 
Furthermore, when the salesperson asks, "Would you like to pay 
for insurance against theft, breakage, hardware malfunctions, 
software malfunctions, lightning strikes, etc.?" it becomes very 
easy to call to mind ways in which your iPhone might meet its 
demise. 
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did not plan to buy the warranty before.92  The availability of the insurance 
(which as a general category is something that responsible people buy93), 
together with the salesman’s helpful explanation of the benefits and the 
satisfied people who have bought it, can make purchasing the add-on 
insurance seem like the right thing to do.94  
These heuristics work together to make purchasing the insurance 
feel like the right thing to do.  As a result, many consumers are willing to 
pay a small additional “cost” to protect themselves against the negative 
emotions associated with a future “loss” that looms larger than it rationally 
should.  While this process could be described in terms of mistakes about 
probabilities, we think that it is better understood as emotional risk 
management: paying for peace of mind 
 
2.  Tests of the mistaken calculator vs. emotional risk 
management explanations 
 
A recent article by Marieke Huysentruyt and Daniel Read (H&R) 
reports the results of survey research into the purchase of extended 
warranties that provides some support for both the mistaken calculator and 
the emotional risk management hypotheses, while concluding that 
emotional risk management offers the better explanation.95  Using 
convenience samples that were weighted toward people with a greater 
immediate need for money and, thus, more disinclined than usual to spend 
 
92 Jonathan Baron explains that the endowment effect is a kind of status quo 
bias, in which “people are unwilling to give up their endowment, which they now 
‘have,’ for what they would otherwise prefer to it.”  Baron, supra note 91, at 297. 
93 See TOM BAKER, Risk, Insurance and the Social Construction of 
Responsibility, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 33, 38 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). 
94 In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan also offered a useful description of this 
point: 
 
[S]ometimes an apparently neutral question or offer actually 
conveys some normative expectations. This is true for trivial 
questions like, "Would you like to wash your hands before we 
eat?" to the more serious: "Would you like to preserve your 
infant's cord blood?" People are being offered these weird 
insurance products and don't know what the prudent or 
responsible choice is. The limited information they have based 
on the offer is that apparently a market for these products exists. 
 
95 See Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How do People Value Extended 
Warranties? Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197, 
215 (2010). 
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money today to buy future protection, H&R asked people to imagine 
buying a washing machine.  They then asked two sets of questions that 
were directly related to an extended warranty offered in connection with 
that purchase.  One set of questions elicited their evaluation of the expected 
financial value of the extended warranty.96  A second set of questions 
elicited their assessment of the emotional benefits from purchasing the 
warranty.97  They also asked a third, unrelated, set of questions that 
measured the cognitive capacities of the participants.98  
The answers to all three sets of questions were correlated with the 
participants’ predicted likelihood of buying the extended warranty.  People 
who placed a higher financial value on the extended warranty were more 
likely to say they would buy it.99  People who scored higher on the 
cognitive tests placed lower (but still inflated) financial values on the 
extended warranty and, thus, were less likely to say they would buy it.  
People who highly valued the emotional benefits were more likely to say 
that they would buy it.  The first two correlations support the mistaken 
calculator hypothesis; the third supports the emotional risk management 
 
96 These questions inquired into the fair price was for the warranty, the market 
price for the warranty, how often the washing machine would break down during 
the extended warranty period, and how much it would cost to repair the machine if 
it broke down.  Id. at 203-04.  
97  Using a seven point Likert-scale, they asked participants to agree or 
disagree with six statements about the warranty: 
 
1. It would give me peace of mind. 
2. If I didn’t buy it and the washing machine broke down, I 
would feel a  
 lot of regret. 
3. It would be comforting to have the protection of the 
warranty. 
4. Even without the warranty I would not worry about repair 
costs. 
5. I would feel more stress without the warranty. 
6. Hopefully I won’t need a repair, but I would rather not take 
the risk. 
 
Id. at 207. 
98 They used the Cognitive Reflection Test discussed in detail in Shane 
Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
25, 26-29 (2005). 
99 It was the predicted cost of the breakdown that most strongly affected the 
perceived financial value, rather than the predicted frequency of the breakdown. 
This is an example of probability neglect.  See Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95, 
at 208 (showing how participants generally overestimated the cost of repair and 
consequently overestimated the actuarial value). 
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hypothesis. Among these correlations, however, the emotional benefit 
assessment was by far the strongest.  
Notably, the relationship between the emotional benefits reported 
by the individuals and their responses to the other two sets of questions was 
independent.  In other words, the perceived emotional benefits strongly 
affected the willingness to buy the extended warranty, without affecting the 
expected financial value of the warranty.  This same result holds true for 
participants with higher cognitive capacities.  Higher cognitive functioning 
participants were less likely to buy the warranty, but that effect came 
entirely through their lower estimates of the expected financial value of the 
warranty, not through their emotional benefit score.  Put another way, even 
the higher cognitive functioning people had heterogeneous assessments of 
the emotional benefits of an extended warranty, and the differences in those 
assessments strongly affected their reported willingness to buy the 
warranty.  
Taken as a whole, the H&R result supports the emotional risk 
management hypothesis more strongly than the mistaken calculator 
hypothesis as an explanation for the demand for extended warranties.  
Some people were willing to buy extended warranties because they greatly 
exaggerated the costs of repairs, but more people – including the 
cognitively advantaged – were willing to buy the warranties because they 
highly valued the “peace of mind” the warranties provide.  The logical 
extension of this finding is that, to at least some degree, people already 
know that the price for extended warranties significantly exceeds the 
expected cost for the company selling the warranty.  People are willing to 
pay that (high) price because they value the emotional benefits the 
insurance provides.  
A very recent working paper by Pranav Jindal provides some 
additional support for the emotional risk management explanation.100  
Jindal used conjoint analysis, a survey and statistical technique in which 
subjects choose among different combinations of features that are presented 
in a manner that allows the researcher to determine the relative importance 
of those features to the subjects.101  
Jindal presented his subjects – executive and full time MBA 
students – with choices of washers and optional extended warranties. 
 
100 See Jindal, supra note 20. 
101 The idea is similar to hedonic pricing models in economics.  In both, the 
goal is to uncover valuations for individual attributes of a complex product.  For 
example, new car buyers assign different weights to speed, looks, mileage, 
reliability, and so on, and the methods allow researchers to discern (average) 
valuations attached to each attribute. See generally Paul E. Green & V. Srinivasan, 
Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook, 5 J. CONS. RES. 103 
(1978). 
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Importantly, he informed these, presumably numerate, subjects about the 
frequency and cost of the repairs that would be covered by the extended 
warranties, thereby reducing the likelihood that they would be “mistaken 
calculators.”   He varied the choices presented to the subjects along a 
variety of dimensions, including the price of the washer, the price of the 
extended warranty, the probability of washer failure, and the cost of the 
repair.  Using the resulting data Jindal then applied logistic regression and 
Bayesian modeling techniques to evaluate how subjects weighted the 
different features and to develop different models of the choices.102 
Consistent with past experience (over half had previously 
purchased an extended warranty),103 the subjects frequently chose the 
extended warranties offered in the surveys.  Significantly, they were more 
likely to choose the warranty if they had already chosen to buy the washing 
machine than if they were offered the washing machine and warranty as a 
package, suggesting an endowment effect.104  As with Sydnor’s 
homeowners insurance, ordinary expected utility analysis did a poor job of 
explaining the choices, requiring implausibly high levels of risk aversion.  
Allowing for loss aversion and mental accounting significantly improved 
Jindal’s ability to estimate a model that closely predicted the actual 
choices.105  
While the details of Jindal’s analysis are complex, the bottom line 
is that incorporating loss aversion and mental accounting into the model led 
to a better alignment with choices, and more plausible estimates of risk 
aversion, than taking a pure expected utility, Economics 101 approach. 
While Jindal’s research cannot rule out the mistaken calculator hypothesis, 
the fact that there was significant variation in the preferences of his “good 
calculator” subjects and that this variation can be explained in good 
measure by differences in loss aversion lends support to the conclusions we 
reached on the basis of with the H&R results.  People who are more loss 
averse place a higher value on the peace of mind that the warranties 
provide. 
 
 
102 Consistent with standard practice in Bayesian modeling, Jindal selected a 
random set of cases to hold out of the models and then used the models to predict 
the choices made in those cases as a measure of the predictive quality of the 
models. Jindal, supra note 20, at 26. 
103 Id. at 15. 
104 Id. at 20 (“The two stage choices in the sequential survey could lead to a 
sense of ownership of the washer in the second stage, which manifests itself in a 
higher willingness to pay for the warranty”); Id. at 22 (“[S]ubjects are slightly 
more loss averse and have a higher intrinsic preference for warranties in the 
sequential study”). 
105 Id. at 35-36. 
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3.  An important equilibrium point 
 
As a result of these behavioral regularities, “Humans” (real people 
subject to ordinary behavioral biases) sometimes pay a great deal more for 
their insurance than would “Econs” (imaginary people who always behave 
as strictly rational expected utility maximizers).106  Sydnor estimates, for 
instance, that other things equal, “homeowners could expect to save 
roughly $4.8 billion per year by holding the highest available deductible”107 
instead of buying more expensive coverage.  
As Sydnor points out, however, estimates of this sort can be 
seriously misleading as a guide for regulation, because they ignore the way 
markets equilibrate.  Indeed, Sydnor concluded that the insurer he studied 
did not earn excess profits on its low-deductible policies, even though 
consumers “overpaid” for these policies relative to the expected value of 
the low deductible.  That’s because low-deductible consumers had higher 
claim rates, presumably due to the presence of adverse selection.  The low-
deductible consumers, who had private information about their own 
elevated likelihood of making a claim, chose policies that reflected this 
information.  In fact, those with a $500 deductible had about a 50 percent 
higher claim rate than those with a $1000 deductible, by various measures 
that controlled for the fact that people with a $1000 deductible cannot make 
a claim for a $900 loss.108  
I may be able to get a better view at the ball game if I stand up, but 
this does not imply that everyone can simultaneously get a better view if we 
all do so. Similarly, Sydnor concludes that “[i]ndividual customers could 
benefit financially by avoiding over-insuring modest risk.  However, if all 
homeowners changed their behavior, the company would likely need to 
raise insurance costs or create a new higher deductible in order to separate 
the more and less risky customers . . . . [I]f all customers had standard risk 
preferences, the new market equilibrium would not necessarily be welfare-
improving for the customers.”109  
 
106 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
107 Sydnor, supra note 77, at 187. 
108 Roughly 3-3.5% for the $500 deductible, vs roughly 2% for the higher 
deductible. Id. at 198.  It is important to control for the fact that those with a lower 
deductible can make claims (e.g., for between $500 and $1000) that those with a 
higher deductible cannot; thus, it is appropriate to use the rate of claims in excess 
of the higher deductible for this comparison.  Some of the increased claiming may 
be the result of moral hazard.  Teasing out which is a complex matter that was not 
necessary for Sydnor’s purposes.   Cf. Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral 
Hazard in Health Insurance, (NBER, Working Paper No. 16969, Apr. 2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16969. 
109 Sydnor, supra note 77, at 198.  
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To this point in the analysis, it is easy to see the appeal of 
insurance against small losses and, by extension, the appeal of the 
consumer sovereignty defense of a light touch to the regulation of that 
insurance.  Colin Camerer and colleagues and Daniel Schwarcz follow this 
line of reasoning in arguing that mistakes can and should be corrected by 
disclosure, but that if consumers are buying, for example, extended 
warranties because of loss or regret aversion, or as relief for “anxiety,” they 
should be free to do so, because restricting their ability to make such 
decisions would leave them (subjectively) worse off. 110 
What the consumer sovereignty defense misses, however, is the 
institutional context.  When insurance is sold as an add-on, the resulting 
equilibrium can, in effect, require the seller to exploit vulnerable 
consumers in order to compete in the market for the base product to which 
the add-on insurance is attached.  Understood in this way, regulation 
protecting consumers from sellers pushing add-on insurance also frees up 
sellers to compete on the basis of what everyone understands to be their 
core function: selling the base product.  We explain this institutional 
context and the equilibrium effects next, before turning to the distributional 
and efficiency benefits to be gained from regulating add-on insurance. 
 
B.  EXPLAINING THE HIGH PRICES CHARGED FOR ADD-ON INSURANCE 
 
We begin with the “shrouding” model of two-stage or ‘tied’ 
purchases developed by Gabaix and Laibson.111  We summarize that model 
here, stressing its prediction that when some actors are subject to a 
plausible behavioral anomaly – an anomaly that is consistent with observed 
behavior in the add-on insurance market – inefficient and discriminatory 
 
110 Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1253-54, noting that consumers purchase 
what seem to be extravagantly over-priced extended warranties and suggesting that 
the problem could be solved by disclosing the true frequency of repair because:  
“[i]f disclosure reduces warranty purchases by reminding consumers of the low 
chance of product breakage, then purchasing the warranty would have been a 
mistake rather than a preference. If informed consumers continue to purchase the 
warranties, then it is quite possible that they have good reason to do so, however 
unfathomable that decision may seem to an economist.”; Schwarcz, supra note 13, 
at 31, “[A]rgues that the insurance demand anomalies . . . can plausibly be 
explained as sophisticated consumer behavior to manage emotions such as anxiety, 
regret, and loss aversion. Moreover, the capacity of insurance to address these 
negative emotions is not necessarily an artifact of manipulative insurance sales or 
marketing. Rather, it may be a sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of 
consumers to manage emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their 
agents’) sales efforts.” 
111 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 12, at 505–07. 
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terms can survive in equilibrium even if a substantial portion of consumers 
are careful shoppers.112  
The shrouding model imagines a two-step purchase process of 
exactly the sort that takes place with add-on insurance products. In the first 
step, a consumer purchases a base good or service, and then in the second 
step optionally makes a secondary purchase that is somehow tied to the 
first. Gabaix and Laibson use examples such as a laser printer and 
replacement cartridges, a hotel room and telephone charges, and a car 
rental and a pre-paid tank of gas. 
In constructing their model, Gabaix and Laibson recognize that 
consumers are not all alike in their shopping behavior.  To simplify, they 
divide consumers into just two types: “myopes,” who don’t think about the 
possibility of future “add-ons” when they make their initial purchase, and 
“sophisticates,” who do.  Consumers make the initial purchase in a 
competitive market, in which the prices charged by all sellers for the base 
product are completely observable.  That first purchase then exposes the 
buyer to an optional add-on purchase from the same seller, in a market in 
which the price for the second purchase is unobservable at the time the 
initial purchase is made (unless one inquires about it).  We think it is 
helpful to think of the second stage purchase as taking place in a 
“situational monopoly” in which the seller has a captive market for that 
purchase.113  As Gabaix and Laibson observe, the second stage price – for 
the cartridge, the telephone charges, or the add-on insurance – typically is 
significantly above the marginal cost of providing the good or service.  One 
could presumably buy an extended warranty separately from the primary 
purchase, but this turns out to be rare in practice,114 with the result that 
 
112 By contrast, models with heterogeneously informed consumers but no 
behavioral anomaly suggest that inefficient pricing is unlikely to survive an 
equilibrium.  Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 conclude that “[t]he 
presence of at least some consumer search in a market creates the possibility of a 
‘pecuniary externality’: persons who search sometimes protect nonsearchers from 
overreaching firms.”  Moreover, in their model, if at least one third of consumers 
undertake comparison shopping, the market price will be close to the competitive 
price in a market where all consumers are informed.  See id. at 653.  But there are 
grounds to be skeptical about this dynamic.  See Ben-Shahar & Snyder, supra note 
6, at 742-49 (concluding that the empirical history of mandated disclosure has 
shown that there has been a history of failure in employing mandated disclosure to 
assist consumers in making choices in the market). 
113 See supra, n. 14. 
114 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 87 (indicating that 69% of 
extended warranties were purchased from the retailer/shop that consumers 
purchased the insured product from).  Patricia McCoy (personal correspondence) 
points out to us that after she refinanced her own mortgage, she received numerous 
unsolicited offers for credit life insurance from insurers that were unaffiliated with 
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most extended warranties are sold at decidedly supra-competitive, 
monopoly-like prices. Their shrouded pricing model provides an 
explanation for why.  
The explanation begins with the observation that in a competitive 
market, sellers must earn zero profit on the combination of TV set and 
extended warranty.  Since the second stage monopoly allows the seller to 
extract supra-competitive prices for the extended warranty, the prices on 
TV sets must therefore be lower than they would be if they were sold on 
their own. Suppose now that a firm tries to compete by offering a lower 
second-stage price – e.g., on extended warranties – than its rival, and by 
alerting potential customers to the fact that its rivals charge more (“Come 
buy from us – we charge less for our extended warranties”).  Doing so has 
two consequences. First, it educates the rival’s sophisticated consumers that 
the rival is using high profits on the add-on to subsidize low prices for the 
TV.  The sophisticates will thus prefer to buy the TV from the rival (at the 
cross-subsidized price) and avoid the rival’s high add-on charges.  They 
can do this by substituting a competitively-supplied extended warranty for 
that offered by the seller or, better yet, by not buying one at all and relying 
instead on savings or a credit card to replace the product if it breaks.     
Importantly, however, this advertising will have no effect on the rival’s 
myopic consumers, who aren’t paying attention to the second-stage 
transaction at all.115  Thus, competitive attempts to unmask a rival’s high 
add-on prices will only succeed in driving sophisticated customers to the 
rival, and will not do anything for the firm providing the educational 
information. Hence, there will be no reason for any firm to try to unmask 
its rivals’ high add-on fees, which can then persist in equilibrium. 
To bring this point home, try shopping for a rental car using 
Expedia or other web-based travel sites.  All show a “total price” that is the 
base charge in Gaibaix and Laibson’s terms.  None show the price for the 
collision damage waiver or supplemental liability insurance in any easily 
comparable way.  If you spend enough time on the website you can find 
that information, but nowhere is it combined and presented in a table for 
 
her lender.  She suggests that a separate market is possible (at least for those who 
do not purchase insurance from the lender at the time of borrowing), but that the 
disorganized state of the market and the inability of consumers to make 
comparisons creates a somewhat similar situational monopoly, if perhaps for 
different reasons. 
115 Consistent with the shrouded pricing model, the U.K. Office of Fair 
Trading reports that more than half of the people who purchase extended 
warranties had not considered purchasing an extended warranty before purchasing 
the covered product.  See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 36 (only 39% 
of extended warranty holders agreed that they had intended to take out an extended 
warranty before purchasing the insured product).   
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easy comparison.  Interestingly, Expedia offers a collision damage waiver 
that can be used at any car rental agency and that is much less expensive 
than those sold by the rental car companies.116  If the market for collision 
damage waivers was competitive, rental car companies would not be able 
to charge so much more than Expedia.  A “sophisticate” who wants a 
collision damage waiver will buy it from Expedia and rent the car from the 
company with the cheapest base charge.  
We take some comfort from the fact that the existence of 
situational monopolies has been understood for a long time.  Writing in 
1958, Philip H. Peters, a Vice President at John Hancock Life Insurance, 
diagnosed the problem in credit life insurance as follows: 
 
[A]buses [of consumers] are possible because borrowers 
who take out personal loans or who buy on time are a 
captive insurance market.  Their lack of knowledge, their 
need or their diffidence makes them receptive when the 
lender or dealer suggests that the loan be insured, and they 
are usually unable to defend themselves against excessive 
charges or other overreaching.  In these circumstances, 
competition among insurance companies does not protect 
the borrower.  Insurers are competing for the lender’s 
patronage, not the borrower’s; the lender is interested in a 
high premium because his commission or dividend will be 
higher if the premium is larger.117 (Emphasis supplied). 
 
The presence of the situational monopoly undercuts the consumer 
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure-only approach to the 
regulation of add-on insurance products.118  Even if consumers are not 
“mistaken” in purchasing add-on insurance and, instead, are motivated to 
purchase that insurance by genuine (albeit irrational) fears or anxieties, it 
does not follow that they should over-pay for the insurance they purchase, 
as the shrouding model predicts and the evidence we reviewed in Part I 
shows to be the case.  Even if the add-on product meets some real need that 
 
116 Expedia, Frequently Asked Questions, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE, 
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/contact-us/faq.jsf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2013); Expedia, Why Should I buy?, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE,  
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/home.jsf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
117 Neither Peters nor the U.K. Competition Commission invoke consumer 
irrationality to explain the absence of competitive pricing in credit life.  Peters, 
supra note 1; U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3 at 3-10.    
118 See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 39 (interventions monopolizing genuine 
consumer preferences for the benefit of those consumers are troubling because they 
undermine welfare economics and consumer sovereignty). 
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was not the product of seller-created pressure, framing, or advertising, 
consumers should not have to pay vastly more for such insurance than it 
costs to provide. 
The situational monopoly that Peters identified – and that the 
shrouded pricing model explains – suggests a market failure that regulation 
could potentially address, even if insurance is purchased for “legitimate-
but-non-standard” reasons such as regret- or loss-aversion.  The market 
failure arises not from consumer motivation per se, but from the way such 
motivations shape the resultant market equilibrium and reduce the ability of 
competitive market forces to protect consumers from overpaying.  
In this regard, add-on insurance products present a very different 
case than low deductible homeowner’s insurance.  People who choose the 
low deductible homeowners’ insurance policies might appear to overpay 
for their insurance, because the low deductible is over-priced in relation to 
the expected benefit of the deductible considered in isolation.  Yet, as 
Sydnor’s equilibrium analysis reveals, they do not actually overpay for 
their insurance as a group, because they have higher claim costs. Their 
preference for the low deductible functions as a sorting device that 
identifies them as more costly to insure.119  
Add-on insurance also functions as a sorting device.  But that 
sorting device has little or nothing to do with the cost of providing the add-
on insurance. Instead, it sorts consumers according to their foresight and 
vulnerability to the shrouded pricing dynamic.  The people who buy add-on 
insurance overpay for that insurance, compared to what would be paid in a 
competitive market, because the shrouded pricing dynamic gives the seller 
the ability to charge a situational monopoly price. 120  This price provides 
 
119 Sydnor’s research suggests that the availability of different levels of 
deductibles in homeowners’ insurance facilitate what one of use has called “risk 
classification by design.”  See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and 
Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1577, 1588 (2011) (a reduction in plan variation fosters “risk classification by 
design” which is the creation of separate risk pools as individuals self-select into 
different health care products according to their self-assessed health risk status).  
This is, of course, exactly what the famous Rothschild/Stiglitz model shows is the 
only possible (Nash) equilibrium in a world of asymmetric information.  See 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. OF ECON. 
629, 633 (1976).  The idea is to induce separation (self-selection) by offering a 
menu of policies such that: (i) both policies earn 0 profit, given who buys them and 
(ii) the high-deductible policy is cheaper but excludes just enough risk so that the 
high-risk group prefers the low-deductible policy.  Id. at 636-37, 646. 
120 Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 217(“The central feature of a 
functioning market is that because providers compete for the business of 
customers, prices are pushed downward, and consumers can get the best deal with 
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ample incentive to push people into buying protection that they don’t really 
need or would be much better off buying somewhere else.  The extra 
profits the retailers earn from that insurance reduces the base price that 
everyone pays for the underlying product or service, meaning that – as in 
the shrouded pricing model – the people who are vulnerable to the 
situational monopoly subsidize those who are not. 
Moreover, if regret-aversion is the motivation for buying an add-on 
insurance product, it is not clear that the product in fact increases welfare in 
the manner that the defenders of consumer sovereignty assert.  If there were 
no extended warranties available, the consumer could not experience regret 
for having failed to purchase one.  Thus, a policy-maker who was 
convinced that regret-aversion was the reason for consumer purchase of 
insurance product could ban the insurance with no loss in welfare.  This is a 
case where supply creates its own demand.  If we think the demand is 
welfare-reducing, we can eliminate the supply and the demand at the same 
time. 
 
1. Efficiency Consequences of Add-on Insurance 
 
Ending the redistribution of wealth from myopes to sophisticates is 
in our minds sufficient justification for regulatory action to eliminate 
situational monopolies.  The justification is strengthened to the extent that 
the demand for add-on insurance products is seller-induced in the first 
place.  But there are efficiency losses associated with add-on insurance as 
well, stemming from a key institutional fact that is not captured in Gaibaix 
and Laibson’s model: the retailer’s sales efforts.  
In the original shrouded pricing story, sellers do not need to induce 
customers to buy the second stage product – if you own a laser printer, you 
can’t use it for long without purchasing replacement toner cartridges.  But 
add-on insurance is qualitatively different, because customers can and often 
do purchase the primary product (TV set, car rental) without ever needing 
to buy the insurance.  We suspect that relatively few consumers would 
independently request extended warranties if they were not urged to buy 
them by sellers (though there may be more people who would continue to 
buy them in the future having first been persuaded to do so).   At a 
minimum, the sellers are taking advantage of the availability heuristic (by 
 
the minimum cognitive effort – they do not have to combine breakdown 
probabilities and repair costs because warranty sellers have done it for them.  To a 
first approximation, all consumers have to do is choose or reject the best deal 
amongst those available.  If a consumer believes that a warranty is worth three 
times its objective value, but finds that she can buy it for one third of that price, she 
will buy it and obtain the benefits from knowing she has obtained a bargain as well 
as the warranty itself.”) 
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highlighting the possibility that the product will fail plus the certainty of 
death), the endowment effect (by selling the extended warranty in a second 
step, after the customer has decided to buy), and regret aversion (by 
causing consumers to imagine a future regret that would not exist absent 
the over-priced insurance).  Quite likely they are doing even more to 
manipulate buyers, as the U.K. Competition Commission reported.121  It 
would be astonishing if they were not, given the truly extraordinary profits 
that sellers earn on add-on insurance. 
Seller efforts to induce consumers to purchase unneeded add-on 
insurance are a waste of salesperson and consumer time: Simply charging a 
higher price for the TV set and abandoning the extended warranty 
altogether would free up resources for more productive uses.  A recent 
story in the New York Times gives a sense of the inefficient practices 
involved.  According to one whistle-blower, Staples (the office products 
store)   
 
[h]as in place a set of incentives that make it unpleasant, to 
put it mildly, for staffers to sell a computer without a 
whole bunch of accessories, particularly a service plan. 
Staples . . . has a system called Market Basket that tracks 
how many dollars’ worth of add-ons each staffer sells.  
[E]ach time you sell a computer, you need to sell, on 
average, $200 worth of other stuff.  And that average is 
carefully tracked.  Sales staffers who aren't meeting their 
goals are coached, and if that doesn't work . . . there will be 
disciplinary action that can lead up to termination; 
underperformers can also end up with lots of night and 
weekends shifts or even a reduction in scheduled hours.122 
 
 
121 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 872 (1991) long ago pointed out that a few 
“home run” sales (those with extraordinary markups) accounted for a significant 
proportion of a new car dealers’ profits.  The pursuit of such large markups 
plausibly drives much of the hard sell behavior for which car sales are well-known, 
and an analogous set of incentives operates in the add-on insurance market.  See 
also U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at app. 2.1 (list of 
unacceptable practices). 
122 Moreover, store managers who can’t keep their storewide “Market Basket” 
numbers up face “conference calls with district managers” and other discipline.   
One store manager was told: “‘If you can’t do the job, you can go sell fries at 
McDonald’s.’”  David Segal, Selling It With Extras, or Not at All, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/your-money/sales-incentives-
atstap les-draw-complaints-the-haggler.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&emc=eta1. 
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As a result, sales personnel seeking to keep their Market Basket 
average high will actually refuse to sell a computer to a customer who 
declines to purchase the extended warranty.  This practice is common 
enough to have a name: “Walking the customer,” “because consumers are 
essentially shooed out the door empty-handed” if they want to buy a 
computer without the warranty.123  While it is difficult to quantify the time 
and hassle consumed by such hard-sell tactics, anyone reading the customer 
complaints about these practices would recognize that they generate 
considerable frustration. 
These last observations suggest a possible role for regulation that 
would attempt to make extended warranties and other forms of add-on 
insurance a better deal for consumers by addressing the market failure 
attributable to the situational monopoly enjoyed by the product retailer.  
 
IV. REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
 
There are four potential regulatory strategies to address the 
situational monopoly prices charged for add-on insurance: mandating 
enhanced disclosure, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on, 
regulating the price of the insurance, and using information technology to 
eliminate the situational monopoly.  Enhanced disclosure has been tried 
many times, including in the add-on insurance context, and the evidence 
shows that disclosure does not work, at least not for add-on insurance 
products.  By contrast, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on 
works well, perhaps even too well in some contexts.  We recommend 
banning insurance add-on sales when consumers do not really need to 
purchase insurance together with the primary product or service, such as 
extended warranties and credit life insurance.  But a ban goes too far when 
some consumers need to be able to buy the insurance as an add-on.  The 
one example we have identified is when a consumer without a personal 
auto policy rents a car, but there may be other examples that have not 
 
123 David Segal, A Hard Sell on the Extras, Revisited, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/your-money/another-look-at-a-hard-
sell -on-extras-at-staples-stores.html?emc=eta1.  For another recent example, 
consider the practice of overbilling for collision damage waivers.  Tara Siegel 
Bernard, A Quick Electronic Signature at the Car Rental Office, and Then Trouble, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/your-money/for-
car-renters-signing-on-the-electronic-tablet-may-mean-trouble.html?emc=eta1.  
According to one source, Dollar Rent a Car charged at least 100 consumers for 
collision damage waivers that they had explicitly denied to purchase by checking a 
box on an electronic data entry form.  Whether this kind of overbilling represents a 
deliberate policy or simply a computer glitch, it is clear that the profitability of 
CDW’s drastically reduces the incentives to correct this problem. 
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occurred to us.  Price regulation could help protect consumers from the 
situational monopoly pricing in such situations.  We greatly prefer the 
fourth strategy, however: using information technology to eliminate the 
situational monopoly.  There is some precedent for this approach.  The 
Office of Fair Trading in the UK is in the process of implementing an 
information technology solution as a result of their investigation into why 
the Competition Commission’s disclosure strategy for extended warranties 
didn’t work.  This part briefly describes these four strategies and explains 
our recommendations among them. 
 
A. ENHANCED DISCLOSURE 
 
Historically, enhanced disclosure has been the preferred free 
market regulatory strategy, including for add-on insurance.124  Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider have recently described in great detail the 
failure of disclosure as a regulatory strategy.125  One need not endorse their 
across-the-board rejection of disclosure to agree with their conclusions in 
the add-on insurance context.  The shrouded pricing model fits the add-on 
insurance product too well to expect disclosure to work. This conclusion is 
borne out by the available evidence.  A highly regarded U.K. government 
agency – the Competition Commission – recently tried a well-calibrated 
enhanced disclosure approach for extended warranties.  It failed. 
The Competition Commission conducted an investigation of 
extended warranties sold in connection with consumer electronics, 
producing an impressive and extensive report that we have relied upon for 
some of our empirical assertions about extended warranties.126  The 
Commission’s principle recommendation was to mandate advertising of the 
extended warranty price along with the price of the covered product, 
thereby allowing consumers to shop on the basis of the combined price.127  
The Commission also proposed three reforms designed to reduce the 
likelihood of the customer being pressured into buying the extended 
warranty: (1) obligating the retailer to provide an offer of an extended 
warranty that could be accepted at any time during the first 30 days after 
the purchase (so the consumer could think about it); (2) requiring the 
warranties to be cancellable with full refund rights for the first 30 days and 
on a pro rata basis for the life of the warranty; and (3) obligating the retailer 
to provide an informational booklet at the time of the sale that would 
explain to the consumer how to get an extended warranty from an 
 
124 See Camerer, et al., supra note 13, at 1254; Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 42. 
125 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 742-43.   
126 See U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 15-16 (summary of 
the study). 
127 Id. at 10. 
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independent third party provider.128  All four reforms were adopted by 
regulation, effective April 2005.129 
Taken together, these reforms reflected the Commission’s 
conclusion at the time that the excess profits from extended warranties 
resulted from a combination of (a) collusion among retailers to refrain from 
advertising the extended warranty prices and (b) improper selling practices.  
Because retailers know that they can make so much money from pressuring 
customers into buying overpriced extended warranties, the retailers collude 
to preserve their collective ability to charge excessive prices, or so the 
Commission seemed to suggest.  
We are skeptical that retailers could successfully collude in this 
manner, however.  There are hundreds (maybe even thousands) of retailers 
offering extended warranties, and it seems highly implausible that they 
could collusively agree to maintain high prices without chiseling.  If 
making the price of the extended warranty more transparent would actually 
change the behavior of consumers, such that they would prefer to buy the 
product from the seller with the cheapest price for both the product and the 
warranty, then some retailer in the crowded and, to our eyes, intensely 
competitive consumer electronic product market would at least try 
competing on that basis.   
The behaviorally-informed shrouded pricing model offers a much 
more compelling story about how supra-competitive pricing could be 
sustained in equilibrium, without any resort to implausible assumptions 
about collusion.  The shrouding model accepts the behavioral decision 
research finding that people regularly depart from the rational actor model, 
focuses on the fact that people are not all the same in this regard, and then 
incorporates an equilibrium analysis that takes into account the behavior of 
both buyers and sellers.  Thus, at a minimum, it provides a much more 
compelling explanation for the observed evidence of over-priced extended 
warranties than does the Competition Commission’s story about seller 
collusion.  
Our skepticism is supported by the fact that profits from extended 
warranties on consumer electronic products in the UK continue to be very 
high, despite the reforms, and the U.K. Office of Fair Trading still sees the 
 
128 A minority of the Commission would have limited point of sale extended 
warranties to a maximum of one year. 
129 The regulation as adopted allowed for a 45 day cancellation period. See 
COMPETITION COMMISSION, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL 
GOODS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC 
ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE U.K., (December 2003), at 10 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/completed/2003/warranty/ind
ex/htm; http://www.legislation.gov.uk.uksi/2005/37/contents/made. 
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market as “unfair and uncompetitive.”130  As the shrouded pricing model 
would predict, disclosure did not work.  The Office of Fair Trading 
conducted a follow-up investigation that concluded in 2011 that disclosure 
is not working and recommended, instead, recommended an information 
technology solution that would eliminate the situational monopoly.  British 
retailers recently accepted that recommendation as an “agreed remedy,” 
perhaps to avoid the ban that we recommend for extended warranties in the 
add-on context.131  We discuss this information technology solution below. 
 
1.  Why more information is unlikely to be effective 
 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider provide an elegant taxonomy of the 
reasons why mandatory disclosure regimes almost never provide much 
protection for those they are designed to benefit.  First, regulators can 
rarely design appropriate disclosure regimes that adequately specify what 
needs to be disclosed and what constitutes sufficient disclosure.  Second, 
even when they want to comply in good faith – and this is only sometimes 
the case – disclosers invariably struggle to interpret the disclosure mandate, 
assemble the required data, and communicate it in meaningful ways.  And 
finally, consumers routinely ignore the information disclosed (i.e., they fail 
to read contract terms, nutrition labels and so on), fail to understand the 
terms, even when they are aware of them, and fail to make appropriate use 
of them, if they’re understood.132  As Ben-Shahar and Schneider put it: 
 
 
130 See Rupert Neate, OFT to look into extended warranties, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 2011, Bus. Section at p. 3 (reporting that the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) is going to examine the £750M market for extended warranties for 
electrical goods again; one in four customers purchase extended warranties; and 
the warranties are still seen by OFT as “unfair and uncompetitive.”).  Prices of 
extended warranties have declined at traditional retailers since the reforms, but that 
appears to be the result of competition from internet retailers and big box stores.  
See Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic 
Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 5-6, (October 2008), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1 
024.pdf. 
131 Market Review of Domestic Electrical Goods, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/othermarketswork 
/electrical-goods/. 
132 It strikes us as ironic that Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donohue 
and Thaler – all distinguished behavioral economists who have made careers out of 
demonstrating that most of us are less-than-fully rational most of the time – 
suggest disclosure as the preferred regulatory solution for dealing with Homer 
Simpson problems.  See Camerer, et al., supra note 86, at 1254. 
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[M]andated disclosure rests on false assumptions: that 
people want to make all the consequential decisions about 
their lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all 
the relevant information, reviewing all the possible 
outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding 
which choice best promotes their preferences.  These 
assumptions so poorly describe how human beings live 
that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s 
decisions.133 
 
Consider applying this schema to the disclosure of information 
regarding, say, extended warranties.  One might be tempted to imagine that 
the first prong – deciding what needs to be disclosed and how – could be 
satisfied fairly easily (albeit at a non-trivial cost): retailers would need to 
compile and disclose information on the probability and cost of repair for 
each item on which a warranty is offered.  That is, a consumer purchasing 
an extended warranty on the Sony TV discussed earlier134 might be told: 
“This TV has a 2.5 percent chance of needing a repair during the warranty 
period, and that repair costs, on average, $400.”  But characterizing the 
relevant probability of repair is not straightforward, especially for new 
products.  And cost-of-repair data are also probably difficult to describe 
and subject to considerable misrepresentation.  Moreover, disclosure would 
have to be regulated as to its timing in the transaction, its precise wording, 
and so on.  These all pose considerable challenges. 
As to the second prong – implementing the disclosure regime – 
since sellers earn substantial profits from the extended warranties, it seems 
obvious that they would have a strong incentive to manipulate the 
information disclosed in an effort to make the warranty look more 
 
133 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 705.  Cf. Andrei Shleifer, 
Psychologists at the Gate, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 1080, 1089 (2012) (reviewing DANIEL  
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW): 
 
Faced with bad choices by consumers, such as smoking or 
undersaving, economists as System 2 thinkers tend to focus on 
education as a remedy.  Show people statistics on deaths from 
lung cancer, or graphs of consumption drops after retirement, or 
data on returns on stocks versus bonds, and they will do better. 
As we have come to realize, such education usually fails. 
Kahneman’s book explains why: System 2 might not really 
engage until System 1 processes the message. If the message is 
ignored by System 1, it might never get anywhere. 
 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31. 
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appealing.  One way to do this would be to exaggerate the frequency or 
cost of repairs (but only, of course, after the consumer has agreed to buy 
the TV).   Another would be to focus on other aspects of the warranty – for 
example, stressing the hassle-reducing benefits of the warranty (“we’ll take 
care of everything…”).  Another would be to exaggerate the length and 
complexity of the disclosures, and to offer, helpfully, to summarize or skip 
the disclosure.  “Oh, yes, here’s another one of those corporate forms for 
you to pretend to read and sign.  I hate those things?  Don’t you?”  Still 
another would be to threaten to walk customers out the door if they don’t 
buy the insurance after reading the disclosures.135 
Finally, the third prong – getting consumers to use the information.  
Suppose that consumers were given the relevant data that would allow 
them to compare the expected cost of repair (probability of repair × cost of 
repair) with the cost of the warranty.  And suppose this information were 
displayed prominently and conveyed clearly.  Even so, the consumer’s 
decision problem is a difficult one.  Consumers presumably differ in their 
discount rates, and in their degree of risk aversion.  We suspect that many 
would not even know that paying $349 for a warranty that insures against 
an 8.5 percent chance of a $400 repair is a bad deal, at least not unless the 
disclosure stated: “Only a fool would purchase this product.”136  Even then 
we suspect that there are plenty of salespeople who could still get 
consumers to buy the insurance using the methods we described along with 
others that we are not devious enough to think up. 
 
B. BANNING ADD-ON SALES OF INSURANCE 
 
The simplest, most straightforward way to protect consumers from 
situational monopoly prices in the add-on insurance market is to prohibit 
what the U.K. Competition Commission calls “point of sale purchase” of 
add-on insurance products.137  This is the regulatory strategy we endorse 
for extended warranties, credit life insurance, and any other add-insurance 
product that could easily be purchased elsewhere, and for which immediate 
 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 122-123.  See supra pp. 42-43. 
136 It is well known that many individuals have a very difficult time 
understanding percentages. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make Cognitive 
Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 83 
(1991). 
137 COMPETITION COMMISSION, MARKET INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT 
PROTECTION INSURANCE, Jan. 29, 2009, at 13 (U.K.). Patricia McCoy (personal 
communication) points out that Congress or the Comptroller of the Currency 
would also have to ban debt cancelation/suspension contracts that are very close 
substitutes for credit life insurance.  Otherwise, the possibility for regulatory 
arbitrage would allow the transactions to continue in a new form.   
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coverage is not truly necessary.  If people really want extended warranties 
or other kinds of add-on insurance for emotional risk management 
purposes, they will find that insurance in all the ways that people find other 
things that they want: on the internet, in the yellow pages, or through a 
print or direct mail advertisement.  
Our proposed ban on retailers’ sale of add-on insurance products is 
similar to, but simpler and stronger than, the complex package of reforms 
that the U.K. Competition Commission recommended in 2009 for payment 
protection insurance.138  Payment protection insurance (PPI) is a commonly 
purchased form of insurance in the UK that combines credit life insurance 
with disability and unemployment protection insurance.  Where credit life 
insurance pays the creditor only in the event of the death of the insured, PPI 
pays the creditor in the event of “involuntary unemployment or incapacity 
as a result of accident or sickness.”139  The Commission found that the 
common practice of selling PPI at the point of sale adversely affected 
competition in the PPI market, disadvantaging, in particular, “providers of 
stand-alone PPI.”140  The Commission prohibited the purchase of PPI at the 
point of sale of credit, requiring creditors to wait to sell PPI until seven 
days after issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures 
to consumers and to a regulatory oversight body in connection with the sale 
of PPI.141  
We recommend a flat prohibition on the sale of most add-on 
insurance by product or service retailers.  We would not allow them to sell 
the insurance after some cooling off window, because there are too many 
ways that retailers can structure the sale of the basic product or service to 
gain advantage in the insurance purchase even after the cooling off period.  
The complexity of the measures that the Competition Commission imposed 
to attempt to reduce this advantage makes our point. A summary 
 
138 Supra note 137 at 13 (concluding that the best approach to regulating credit 
life and similar products is to simply prohibit distributors and intermediaries from 
selling payment protection insurance to their credit customers within seven days of 
a credit sale). 
139 COMPETITION COMMISSION, PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE MARKET 
INVESTIGATION ORDER 2011, 2011, at 8 (defining “PPI”) (U.K). 
140 Id. at 3. 
141 The Commission initially decided to prohibit entirely the purchase of PPI at 
the point of sale of credit, allowing creditors to sell PPI only seven days after 
issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures in connection with 
the offer of PPI.  After an administrative appeal, the Commission relaxed the 
prohibition slightly, allowing point of sale purchase in connection with certain 
retail credit arrangements (e.g., with a department store), and allowing creditors to 
sell PPI to their customers one day after the credit sale in certain limited 
circumstances. Id. at 2. 
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description of these measures fills one half of the Commission’s Notice of 
making an order, and the measures themselves comprise 80% of the fifty-
five page Order. 142  If product or service retailers were to be permitted to 
sell the insurance after some kind of cooling off period, however, similar 
pro-competition disclosure and reporting requirements would be necessary. 
We would exclude from this prohibition the sale of damage 
waivers and auto liability protection by rental car companies to customers 
who do not have their own auto insurance policies.  Such customers must 
have liability protection from somewhere, and they should also be able to 
purchase auto property damage protection.  Because these customers would 
otherwise remain vulnerable to the shrouded pricing dynamic, however, we 
recommend that insurance commissioners employ the measures described 
in subsection 4 to eliminate the situational monopoly. 
 
C.  PRICE REGULATION 
 
Price regulation is a well-established approach to the monopoly 
pricing problem,143 and has long been used in regulating insurance.  
Situational monopolies for add-on insurance are not classic monopolies like 
public utilities, but they present similar opportunities for monopoly pricing.  
And add-on insurance does bear some resemblance to traditional insurance, 
so regulating it the way we regulate many other forms of insurance might 
seem plausible. We do not advocate price regulation for add-on insurance, 
however, because of the transaction costs involved.  
There is a vast literature critiquing price regulation in insurance.144 
Much of that literature concludes that price regulation does not in fact 
lower insurance prices, because the insurance market would be sufficiently 
competitive in the absence of such regulation.145  That is unlikely to be the 
case here: because of the shrouded pricing dynamic and the resulting 
 
142 COMPETITION COMMISSION, Order, supra note 139, § 2.1 at 8; 
COMPETITION COMMISSION, Notice, supra note 139, at 1-4.   
143 For a survey of regulation of monopolies, see generally Rick Geddes, 
Public Utilities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (1999), available at http:// 
encyclo.findlaw.com/5940book.pdf.  
144 See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Regulation in 
Automobile Insurance, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: 
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 285 (J. David 
Cummins ed., 2002) (noting that rate regulation fails to reduce average rates in 
competitive markets); Scott E. Harrington, Insurance Rate Regulation in the 20th 
Century, 19 J. OF INS. REG. 204 (2000) (finding that prior approval rate regulation 
failed to lower average rate levels or expand coverage availability in competitive 
markets).. 
145 E.g., Harrington, supra note 144, at 216; Id. at 309-10. 
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situational monopoly, competition clearly does not constrain add-on 
insurance pricing.  That does not mean that price regulation is likely to be 
effective, however. 
In theory, prices should be set at a level that gives sellers of add-on 
insurance a reasonable rate of return.  In other words, regulators would 
ideally set prices at the actuarially fair value plus some markup for 
overhead, marketing, and profit.  But just figuring out the actuarially fair 
price for extended warranties on a constantly changing array of thousands 
of different consumer products sold by hundreds of different retailers is a 
daunting task.  Estimating reasonable markups for overhead and marketing 
costs constitutes another enormous problem, and the result would clearly be 
subject to manipulation by retailers in obvious ways.  Nevertheless, price 
regulation almost certainly would be better than nothing, just not better 
than our preferred alternatives. 
We prefer, instead, a ban on the sale of add-on insurance by 
product and service retailers, except in the limited exception described 
earlier (when a significant number of consumers need immediate 
coverage).  For those situations we prefer eliminating the situational 
monopoly in the manner we describe next.  
 
D.  BUSTING THE SITUATIONAL MONOPOLY 
 
The final strategy is a new regulatory approach made possible by 
information technology.  This strategy would eliminate the situational 
monopoly by obligating the entity providing the core product or service 
(e.g., the car rental) to allow the customer to select a desired insurance 
product through an independently operated website accessed at the point of 
sale.  This website would list the insurance products, features and prices, 
and allow consumers to use a simple comparison tool.  The insurance 
selection feature of the website would be similar to – but much simpler 
than – the insurance selection feature of existing health insurance exchange 
websites.146  For consumers who did not want the hassle of having to 
 
146 The website for the Massachusetts health insurance exchange, known as the 
Massachusetts Connector (which served as the model for the health insurance 
exchange provisions of the Affordable Care Act), can be accessed at 
http://www.mahealthconnector.org. The leading private health insurance exchange 
is ehealth.com. The ehealth.com selection process is much more complicated than 
the Massachusetts Connector process because ehealth.com cannot provide 
consumers with a definitive price, due to the fact that health insurance companies 
are currently authorized to engage in medical underwriting.  See generally Baker, 
supra note 119 (providing an examination of the distribution of health insurance 
risk and responsibility under the Affordable Care Act). For research on the 
complexity of health insurance choice and what to do to make that choice easier, 
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choose, the website could be programmed to provide a default product 
based on the consumer answering a few questions, or even without 
answering any questions other than responding with a “Yes” to “Do you 
want the standard protection for someone who doesn’t have their own auto 
insurance policy?”147  
The company providing the core product or service should be 
permitted to receive a reasonable servicing fee when the customer buys the 
insurance, but this fee should be based on a formula established by the state 
insurance commission.  The company providing the core product or service 
should not be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the 
purchase of the insurance or from the operator of the independent 
website.148    Otherwise, some or all of the situational monopoly profits will 
continue to flow to the company providing the core product or service.  To 
explain why this is so, we will begin by critiquing a similarly motivated 
regulatory strategy suggested by Huysentruyt and Read, who conducted the 
research on extended warranties that we discussed in Part II.   
Huysentruyt and Read suggested two reforms for the extended 
warranty market that attempt to counteract the situational monopoly that 
results from the shrouded pricing dynamic: (a) requiring retailers to give 
consumers a choice among extended warranty providers at the point of 
sale, and (b) allowing retailers to sell only extended warranties that were 
selected through a competitive bidding process conducted “on behalf of 
consumers.”149  
Although we agree with H&R’s description of the market failure, 
we are skeptical that their proposals would be effective.  Our skepticism is 
easier to explain for the first proposal: requiring retailers to give consumers 
a choice.  As long as the retailer gets to decide which extended warranties 
to offer, obligating the retailer to offer consumers a choice will not reduce 
the situational monopoly prices.  If the retailer gets to decide which choices 
to provide to the consumers, extended warranty providers will have to 
compete to be selected by the retailer.  The way to win that competition is 
by offering the highest commissions to the retailer, not by offering the 
 
see Eric Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The 
Value of Choice Architecture (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 13-28, 2012). 
147 The website could easily be programmed to randomly assign the customer 
to the standard product of one of the insurance sellers, on a turn taking basis, on 
the basis of market share, or any other method that the regulator prescribed. 
148 Note that add-on insurance is “insurance” for regulatory purposes in all 
states when the entity providing the insurance is different than the entity that 
provides the core product or service.  
149 Huystentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 216. Note that they discuss the 
shrouded pricing model. 
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cheapest price to consumers.150  Consumers may end up with a choice, but 
the choice will be among extended warranties sold at or near the situational 
monopoly price. 
Our skepticism about H&R’s second proposal – competitive 
bidding – takes a bit more work to explain.  Initially, we shared H&R’s 
intuition that a competitive bidding process would drive out the situational 
monopoly prices.  Our intuition shifted, however, when we realized that a 
competitive bidding process would only break through the situational 
monopoly if retailers did not have the ability to influence consumers’ 
choice among extended warranties.   
If the retailer can steer the consumer to the warranty paying the 
higher commission, then a warranty supplier will submit a bid that builds in 
high commissions (so the retailer steers customers to the supplier’s 
extended warranty).  This point is pretty obvious.  What is not as obvious is 
the following: even if all the retailer can do is influence whether the 
consumer buys a warranty (but not which warranty), warranty suppliers 
will submit bids that include high commissions.151  The reason is this: if 
retailers are able to influence whether the consumers buy the extended 
warranties (a reasonable assumption in our view), then the retailers, in 
effect, control access to those consumers who will only buy the warranty if 
the retailer engages in the effort needed to persuade them to buy it.  Even if 
the consumer who decides to buy a warranty always chooses the lowest 
priced warranty available, warranty suppliers will have to build into their 
prices compensation sufficient to motivate the retailer to make the effort 
needed to persuade the marginal consumer.   
It would take a model that we have not created in order to work out 
all of the relationships among these assumptions in order to develop a 
thorough understanding of what will emerge from a competitive bidding 
process for the right to offer extended warranties to consumers.  
 
150 This dynamic explains the very high prices for “forced place” auto and 
homeowners insurance. It also explains the high and discriminatory prices for 
credit paid by buyers of new cars who finance their purchases through the 
dealership that is selling them the car. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 2002) (class action suit alleging that 
a car dealership’s retail credit pricing system resulted in discrimination against 
African-American buyers); Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A 
Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts are 
Justified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 692-717 (2007) (analyzing consumer policies in the 
automobile industry that adversely affect minority purchasers). 
151 Note that heterogeneity in susceptibility to retailers’ sales pressure could 
help to explain the shrouded pricing dynamic, if we assume that people either are 
unaware of their susceptibility or mistakenly believe that they will be able to resist 
the pressure this time. 
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Nevertheless, we are confident that this price will reflect compensation to 
the retailer for “selling” the extended warranty to consumers who would 
not buy it if the retailer didn’t put forth some costly effort to persuade 
them.  
H&R’s proposed reforms should be rejected for the same reasons 
the retailer’s commission must be fixed by regulation and retailers cannot 
be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the customer’s 
purchase of the add-on insurance.  A retailer who gets a benefit from the 
purchase of one kind of add-on insurance but not another will have an 
incentive to steer the customer.  And even if the additional benefits are the 
same for all add-on insurance, those additional benefits will motivate sales 
practices that induce customers to buy add-on insurance that they do not 
need. 
These reasons also point to a fatal weakness in the consumer 
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure approach to regulating 
extended warranties.  Recall that the consumer sovereignty challenge was 
based on research supporting the view that buying extended warranties may 
in at least some cases represent “sophisticated consumer behavior to 
manage emotions such as anxiety, regret, and loss aversion” and “a 
sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of consumers to manage 
emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their agents’) sales 
efforts.”152  Yet, as long as we accept that retailers have the capacity to 
influence the number of consumers who buy the add-on insurance, we can 
see that the consumer sovereignty justification actually protects (a) sales to 
people who have to be persuaded, (b) a sales context that provides 
significant opportunity to exploit behavioral biases, and (c) a product – 
add-on insurance – that is demonstrably not in the average buyer’s financial 
interest in most situations (even if some buyers can be persuaded that it will 
make them feel better). Separating the buying from the selling, and the 
selling from the swindling is almost certainly an impossible task.153  The 
U.K. Competition Commission’s reforms did not work in this regard, and 
we doubt that any real world regulator can do a better job.154  Moreover, the 
shrouded pricing model demonstrates that, even if consumers value 
extended warranties for legitimate, if non-standard, reasons, the market can 
still be distorted in a way that leads them to pay far more than the cost of 
 
152 Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 31. 
153 See generally ARTHUR LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976). 
154 See LECG, Ltd., Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended 
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 7 
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-
OFTs-work/oft1024.pdf (finding spotty compliance with the disclosure 
requirements, misinformation regarding consumer rights, and other sales practices 
inconsistent with legal requirements). 
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providing the warranties in question.  It is hard to imagine a “sovereign” 
consumer who would prefer that situation. 
The U.K. Office of Fair Trading has recently imposed a similar, 
situational monopoly-busting reform of the consumer electronic extended 
warranty market in the UK. Like the Competition Commission’s reform of 
the PPI market, however, the OFT’s reform of the extended warranty 
market contains some loopholes that significantly increase the complexity 
of the regulatory apparatus.155  Simpler is better in our view. If our 
situational monopoly busting reform for auto rental insurance were to be 
subject to the same kinds of exceptions as the extended warranties in the 
U.K. context, however, some of same kinds of regulatory complexities 
would be needed to prevent the re-emergence of situational monopoly 
pricing.  
 
E.  EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
Under any of the approaches that would actually work – a ban, 
price regulation, or busting the situational monopoly – there would be 
general equilibrium effects of the sort that Justin Sydnor explored in the 
homeowners’ insurance deductible context.  The list prices for some 
products and services would likely increase, Gabaix and Laibson’s 
“sophisticates” would receive smaller subsidies from the “myopes,” and 
core product sellers who depend disproportionately on profits from add-on 
insurance would suffer in relation to sellers who do not.  One result may be 
to increase the share of internet commerce, as the British experience 
suggests that traditional retailers depend more on profits from extended 
warranties than internet sellers.156  This latter possibility, together with the 
political clout of the numerous, geographically distributed traditional retail 
establishments (and their employees and suppliers) may provide the best 
explanation for why the Competition Commission failed to propose a ban 
on retailers’ sale of extended warranties in 2005, and why the OFT watered 
down its situational monopoly busting reform of the extended warranty 
market in 2012. 
Some readers – and some of the literature on extended warranties – 
suggest that the resulting equilibrium might be welfare reducing, if retailers 
are using the add-on insurance to engage in (welfare-enhancing) price 
discrimination.157  The idea is that the excess profits from the add-on 
 
155 See supra note 5. 
156 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 26. 
157 By extending the size of the market via selective discounts, price 
discrimination reduces deadweight loss. Suppose a monopolist’s profit-maximizing 
single price for a movie ticket is $8. There are some older customers with 
reservation prices of $5 who do not find it worthwhile to purchase a ticket at that 
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insurance allow retailers to lower the price of the core product.  This in turn 
permits some additional sales to customers who would not buy at the 
higher price that would result if our proposal were adopted.  It might 
ultimately be the case that the loss in welfare to those priced out of the 
market for TV sets exceeds the gain in welfare to those who no longer buy 
add-on insurance they don’t need (or who buy it at a discount).158  This is, 
of course, an empirical question, and different people will have different 
intuitions about the welfare analysis.  Our intuition is that the savings to 
everyone from not being “nudged,” or worse, to buy the add-on insurance, 
plus the large savings to the people who don’t buy or don’t overpay for the 
add-on insurance outweigh the loss in welfare from those priced out of the 
market by the higher price for the base product or service.  But we freely 
admit that the alternative is possible (albeit unlikely in our view).  
This empirical question raises the important normative question of 
what we think about price discrimination based on heterogeneity in 
violations of rationality, especially those that encourage sellers to exploit 
cognitive and other limitations.  At least in the realm of insurance, where 
expected utility theory offers a powerful guide to value and society is 
already committed to strong consumer protection, we are troubled by such 
price discrimination, and we expect that insurance regulators are as well.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We have focused on one kind of insurance that people often buy, 
even though a reasonably informed, rational person would not buy it 
(extended warranties) and two other kinds of insurance that makes sense 
for only some of the people who buy them (rental car damage waivers and 
credit life insurance) and which are just as over-priced as the first.  Many of 
the behavioral explanations for the gap between expected utility theory and 
 
price. Since the marginal cost of showing the movie is zero, it is inefficient for the 
older customers to be priced out of seeing it. So if the monopolist can selectively 
lower the price for older customers without reducing the price it charges everyone 
else, then it will earn higher revenue, the older customers will see the movie, and 
other customers will be unaffected, leaving everyone better off. 
158 For a basic reference, see Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part 
Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q. J. ECON. 77 (1971) (explaining how 
charging a flat fee plus a per-unit charge allows for greater extraction of consumer 
surplus while simultaneously reducing deadweight loss). In the extended warranty 
context; see Jindal, supra note 20 (raising this possibility in the context of results 
that do not allow him to determine whether this is the case); Junhong Chu and 
Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the 
U.S. Server Market, 28 MARKETING SCI. 99 (2009) (analyzing extended warranties 
as a means of facilitating price discrimination in the U.S. server market and 
estimating their price discrimination value).  
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insurance purchasing practice make some sense in terms of emotional risk 
management.  On this view, buying these kinds of insurance comes to look 
more like a conscious, understandable choice to buy something with real 
value, and less like a cognitive processing mistake that we should de-bias 
or ignore.  If correct, this emotional risk management explanation could be 
understood to support a consumer sovereignty justification for these forms 
of insurance that leads directly to a light touch, disclosure approach to their 
regulation. 
We conclude that this line of reasoning is wrong, at least in the 
case of these kinds of insurance.  It fails to take into account the 
equilibrium analysis of the shrouded pricing model, the supply-induced 
nature of demand for these products, and the practical difficulties inherent 
in the choice/mistake distinction upon which the reasoning depends.  
Behavioral (and other) research has not been kind to the proposition that 
disclosure corrects decisional errors.159  Precisely because consumers who 
buy add-on insurance are not fully rational, frequency-of-repair statistics 
and other forms of “de-biasing” education will be difficult for them to 
process. Behavioral research might help to make disclosure more 
effective,160 but we see no reason to be optimistic that disclosure can fully 
overcome even the most minimal behavioral impediments to appropriate 
decision-making.  This in turn implies that the distinction between mistakes 
(based on incorrect information) and non-standard preferences as motives 
for insurance purchases does not provide a solid basis for regulatory policy.  
Unless we define “mistakes” tautologically (as those decisions that can be 
altered by disclosure), effectively correcting mistakes will often require 
 
159 See generally, e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schnieder, supra note 6 (general 
literature on de-biasing, w/spotty results).  Nor is financial education likely to 
improve consumer decision-making.  See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against 
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) (arguing that financial 
education actually leads to worse consumer decisions).   
160 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/ 
15loewenstein.html, who write:  
 
Behavioral economics should complement, not substitute for, 
more substantive economic interventions. If traditional 
economics suggests that we should have a larger price difference 
between sugar-free and sugared drinks, behavioral economics 
could suggest whether consumers would respond better to a 
subsidy on unsweetened drinks or a tax on sugary drinks. But 
that’s the most it can do. For all of its insights, behavioral 
economics alone is not a viable alternative to the kinds of far-
reaching policies we need to tackle our nation’s challenges. 
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something more than disclosure, and thus entails making it difficult or 
impossible for consumers to do what they “want.”  
The shrouding model we have relied on so heavily in this article 
offers several important insights for the application of behavioral 
economics to the regulation of consumer products and services more 
broadly.  Most significantly, it shows that behavioral “flaws” don’t just 
influence the consumer’s decision about what/how much to buy.  These 
flaws also shape the structure of competition between firms and the 
resultant market equilibrium.  An analysis that focuses only on consumers’ 
deviations from perfect rationality (or non-standard preferences) will miss 
important properties of this equilibrium.  Sadly, there is thus no short-cut 
from behavioral anomaly directly to policy recommendations: rather, as 
Justin Syndor’s homeowner’s insurance analysis also demonstrates, the 
behavioral anomalies have to be inserted into an overall model of market 
functioning to predict how policy can influence welfare.  
We have proposed a three step regulatory solution to the add-on 
insurance problem.  First, unless there is a compelling case that a 
significant group of consumers truly needs to purchase the add-on 
insurance product together with the underlying product or service, the sale 
of the insurance at the same time as the base product should be banned.  
Second, if there is a compelling case that a significant number of 
consumers truly need to purchase the insurance at the same time and place 
as the base product, then regulators should consider whether it is possible 
to create a transparent and competitive on-line market for the add-on 
insurance.  If so, then the sellers of the base product should be prohibited 
from selling the add-on insurance themselves and required to provide a web 
access point in their establishments or on their web pages that directs the 
consumers to the on-line market.  When a consumer purchases the add-on 
product at a store or from a product seller’s web link, the core product or 
service seller should receive a standard, state-regulated commission that 
will fairly compensate the seller for the cost of maintaining the terminal or 
the web link, without motivating the seller to push the add-on insurance.  
Finally, if the regulator is not persuaded that it is possible to create a 
transparent and competitive on-line market, then the regulator should set 
the prices for the add-on insurance. 
 
